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We explore the dynamics of the Scottish National Party (SNP) support using the
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) during 1999-06. We study the relative impor-
tance of political sentiments and egocentric economic evaluations by disentangling the
e¤ects of state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity by gender. Egocentric economic
evaluations constitute an important determinant of SNP support over the entire period,
being this e¤ect stronger among the male electorate. The results are consistent with
the electors holding the incumbent Labour Party accountable for their personal nancial
situation, though nancial security augments the nationalist propensity among partisan
voters. Furthermore, retrospective economic evaluations form a signicant determinant of
incumbent Labour Party support in both the 1999-02 and 2003-06 intervening electoral
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1. INTRODUCTION
How important are economic evaluations in political party support? Do ego-
centric economic perceptions indicate distinct political behaviour by gender or par-
tisanship? We analyse these questions by exploring the dynamics of political party
support and egocentric economic evaluations in Scotland during 1999-2006. Our
investigation has a double aim: on one hand, to analyse the relative importance of
political sentiments in the evolution of SNP support and, on the other, to test the
egocentric (pocketbook) economic voting hypothesis.
Utilising the Scottish extension sample from the BHPS, we nd that the impact
of egocentric economic evaluations varies by partisan attachment and gender, and
that failure to study separately the partisan electorate can lead to erroneous con-
clusions about the role of economic evaluations. In particular, regarding the whole
electorate, egocentric economic evaluations exert a stronger inuence on male SNP
support, while initial party a¢ liation constitutes the most important party sup-
port determinant among the partisan subsamples (regardless of gender). Moreover,
nancial stability and optimism augment partisan voterssupport for the (opposi-
tion) SNP instead of the (incumbent) Labour Party thus, reversing the prediction
of economic voting theories among the partisan electorates. Finally, concerning
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the entire electorate, the electors hold the incumbent government (Labour) party
accountable for their personal nancial situation.
To ensure that our analysis is not merely capturing determinants of national-
ist propensity and to account for outows from the Labour party to parties other
than the SNP, we additionally estimate models of incumbent Labour Party sup-
port. Employing the Labour support indicator produces the mirror image of the
initial estimates for SNP support: the economic evaluations increasing SNP support
reduce the incumbent Labour party support and vice-versa.
As an additional validation test of the economic voting hypothesis, accounting
for the dynamics triggered in di¤erent phases of the intervening electoral cycles,
we estimate (incumbent) Labour support models for the 1999-2002 and 2003-2006
electoral cycles. The estimates clearly indicate that retrospective economic evalua-
tions constitute an important determinant of the incumbent party support during
both electoral cycles.
Studies such as Evans and Pickup (2010) and Johnston et al. (2005) provide ev-
idence against economic voting theories and in favour of the endogeneity argument,
i.e., that individual economic evaluations are conditioned by political preferences
rather than vice-versa. Evans and Pickup (2010) conclude that the incumbent
presidential approval and party identication a¤ect egocentric evaluations while
the reverse does not hold. Johnston et al. (2005) nd that upon controlling for
prior electionsvote, egocentric evaluations have no e¤ect. None of these studies
disaggregates by either gender or party proximity.
Our results extend the ndings and conclusions of Sanders and Brynin (1999),
Evans and Andersen (2006), Nadeau et al. (2012) and Pickup and Evans (2013)
in two important respects. On one side, Sanders and Brynin (1999) nd that eco-
nomic perceptions exert important indirect e¤ects on voterspreferences although
ideological change variables, when included in the same model, outperform changes
in economic evaluations. Similarly, Evans and Andersen (2006) conclude that the
impact of lagged party support on (sociotropic) economic evaluations is consis-
tently stronger than the e¤ects of concurrent and retrospective economic evalua-
tions on party support. In an international comparative study, using instrumen-
tation Nadeau et al. (2012) conclude that (sociotropic) economic evaluations are
signicant, although ideology, past vote recall and partisanship exert more powerful
inuences.1 These ndings are in agreement with our result that for the partisan
fraction of the electorate the impact of egocentric evaluations is reduced and, there-
fore, that failure to study separately the partisan electorate can lead to erroneous
conclusions about the impact of egocentric economic evaluations.
On the other side, Pickup and Evans (2013) conclude that long-term di¤er-
ences in economic evaluations across individuals do inuence party support, while
short-term economic evaluations do not, underlining the need to employ panel data
for a longer time period. Indeed, we nd that the most important party support
determinant for the male electorate, other than initial support, is consistently ex-
pecting uncertain/worse nances. Further, among the partisan electorate consistent
positive nancial expectations and satisfactory current nances are the principal
egocentric determinants of SNP support for males and females, respectively.
Our estimates account for initial political preferences, gender, and partisanship
strength heterogeneity. Moreover, we incorporate dynamics, employ compact un-
balanced and balanced panel sample selection mechanisms and account for unequal
sample selection probabilities. To the best of our knowledge, the present study is
unique in investigating the egocentric economic voting hypothesis and analysing
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longitudinal party support by both partisan proximity and gender.2
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents and discusses data issues.
Section 3 outlines the estimation method, discusses sample selection and attrition
issues, and the treatment of initial conditions. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of
the estimation results, rst discussing the key determinants of SNP support and the
importance of egocentric economic evaluations. Second, it analyses the incumbent
Labour Party support and the validity of the economic voting hypothesis over the
two intervening electoral cycles in the period under study. Section 5 concludes.
2. THE DATA
We use waves 9 to 16 of the BHPS, including the Scotland extension sample,
spanning the period 1999-2006. This dataset contains information from a very rich
questionnaire addressed to about 1,500 Scottish households on a yearly basis. In
addition, we have access to local authority district codes at the household level via
the special conditional access, medium-level geographical identiers, component
of the BHPS, which allows us to control for intra-Scottish regional variation in
political party preferences.3 ;4 Since our main interest is the longitudinal evolution
of political party preferences and voting intentions, accounting for initial conditions,
we consider respondents that are aged 16 or more and that participate in the survey
over at least 3 consecutive periods (permitting inclusion of both dynamics and
initial period political a¢ liation). The choice of age is motivated by the Age of
Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 and by the fact that voting age was reduced to
16 for the 2014 Scottish independence referendum (yet the number of individuals
aged below 18 is very small). In addition, the main samples analysed consider only
respondents present in 1999 (to facilitate initial conditions estimation) that have no
missing values (to allow for lagged party support) in any of the covariates used in
the estimations. These compact unbalanced panels consist of 5,059 male and 5,580
female observations, respectively. A discussion of alternative estimation samples
and attrition issues is relegated to Section 3.
2.1. Measuring Political Party Preferences
The political party supportedis a derived variable from a sequence of follow-
up questions asked in all waves of the BHPS. These questions are: (1) Generally
speaking do you think of yourself as a supporter of any one political party? (2) Do
you think of yourself as a little closer to one political party than to the others? (3)
If there were to be a general election tomorrow, which political party do you think
you would be most likely to support? Respondents are asked question (2) only if
they answered Noto question (1) and are asked question (3) only if they answered
Noto question (2). Finally, if the answer to any of the rst two questions is Yes,
respondents are also asked question (4) Which party do you regard yourself as being
closer to than the others?
From the above set of BHPS questions we dene the dependent variable as a
binary indicator of party support taking the value of one if the individuals stated
party in either question (3) or (4) is the SNP, and zero otherwise. The corresponding
answers to questions (3) and (4) are given in Tables 1 and 2.
We distinguish between two types of respondents or voters, henceforth referred
to as partisans and non-partisans. We dene as partisans those respondents that
consistently (i.e. in every year of individual sample membership) answered Yes
3
to either question (1) or question (2), and non-partisans (ideologically neutral)
as those that have not. Initially we consider estimation including all voters by
summing the responses of questions (3) and (4). In a second stage we consider the
partisan subsample separately to test whether partisanship produces di¤erential
political party preference underlying determinants.
Dening the dependent variable as an indicator of SNP support is corroborated
by the transition probability matrices reported in Tables 3 and 4, where the majority
of outows/inows of SNP supporters correspond to gains/losses of the governing
Labour Party over the period analysed. To account for outows from the Labour
party to parties other than the SNP, an event not captured by our specication
of the dependent variable, we will construct an alternative Labour Party support
indicator. Our ndings indicate that the estimates conduce to the same conclusions
independently of the dependent variable specication.
TABLE 1.— MALE RESPONDENTS: POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORTED
Political Party 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Labour 56 56 67 41 19 25 21 12 297
SNP 36 44 31 32 21 24 20 26 234
Conservative 13 7 9 11 6 5 4 10 65
Lib Dem, SDP 15 20 23 25 31 19 16 14 163
Green Party 1 0 1 3 3 1 1 1 11
other party 4 1 3 3 6 2 1 3 23
other answer 3 9 4 0 3 0 0 0 19
none 46 48 55 42 46 36 28 35 336
inapplicable 628 617 609 528 444 396 368 321 3,911
Total 802 802 802 685 579 508 459 422 5,059
Political Party 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Labour 271 295 300 257 207 177 165 143 1,815
SNP 198 168 156 134 110 89 82 79 1,016
Conservative 101 99 87 76 68 65 61 49 606
Lib Dem /Lib/SDP 46 41 51 48 46 46 45 39 362
Green party 3 4 5 4 3 5 2 2 28
Plaid Cymru 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
other party 6 9 7 8 10 12 11 9 72
other answer 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3
none 2 1 2 0 0 1 2 0 8
inapplicable 174 185 193 157 135 112 91 101 1,148
Total 802 802 802 685 579 508 459 422 5,059
1. Source: University of Essex, ISER, BHPS, Waves 9-16.
2. Sample includes individuals with Ti>2 and no missing values in any of the covariates in the (full sample compact unbalanced) estimations of Table 5.
Party which would vote for tomorrow
Asked if: No political party supported/Not closer to one particular political party
Year
Political party closest to
Asked if: Supporting a particular political party/Closer to one political party than to the others
Year
The BHPS also includes a question about actual party voted for in the 1999
and 2003 Scottish elections. However, actual vote choice is likely to be a proxy
for partisanship a¢ liation and political beliefs, which in turn can predetermine
egocentric and sociotropic evaluations in actual elections. Hence, the association
between prior political a¢ liation and individual economic evaluations is more likely
to be disentangled by using an indicator of political party support, particularly
outside electoral periods (Evans and Andersen, 2006, p.197).
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TABLE 2.— FEMALE RESPONDENTS: POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORTED
Political Party 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Labour 72 58 72 51 28 23 25 19 348
SNP 47 55 43 26 23 29 17 22 262
Conservative 18 11 9 10 6 3 7 7 71
Lib Dem, SDP 14 30 32 17 21 19 13 7 153
Green Party 2 4 3 1 2 3 2 2 19
other party 2 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 7
other answer 6 3 4 0 1 1 0 0 15
none 51 59 57 43 50 42 24 29 355
inapplicable 703 695 695 605 499 426 390 337 4,350
Total 915 915 915 753 631 549 479 423 5,580
Asked if: Supporting a particular political party/Closer to one political party than to the others
Political Party 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total
Labour 326 340 355 284 233 194 180 153 2,065
SNP 151 139 121 125 88 73 73 61 831
Conservative 143 139 127 111 96 82 71 65 834
Lib Dem /Lib/SDP 70 66 77 71 69 62 58 52 525
Green Party 6 5 7 6 6 9 4 4 47
other party 5 5 6 6 6 6 4 1 39
none 2 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 9
inapplicable 212 220 220 148 132 123 89 86 1,230
Total 915 915 915 753 631 549 479 423 5,580
1. Source: University of Essex, ISER, BHPS, Waves 9-16.
2. Sample includes individuals with Ti>2 and no missing values in any of the covariates in the (full sample compact unbalanced) estimations of Table 6.
Party which would vote for tomorrow
Asked if: No political party supported/Not closer to one particular political party
Year
Political party closest to
Year
The determinants of individual political adherence/a¢ liation are typically un-
observed and fairly hard to quantify, one can feel loyal to certain political principles
and at the same time feel closer to more than one political party, changing actual po-
litical party support over time. To measure the degree of political party attachment
over time we use an additional question asked to those respondents that consider
themselves as supporters of or feel closer to one particular party (i.e., respondents
that gave an a¢ rmative answer to either question (1) or question (2) above). They
are asked whether they consider themselves a very strong, fairly strong or not very
strong party supporter. The corresponding variable, termed strong party support,
will refer to individuals having indicated either very or fairly strong party support.
Nationalist sentiments determining party a¢ liation could be captured by the
perceived nationality variable in the BHPS, but this question is only available for
the years 1999, 2002, 2003 and 2006. As a robustness test, we estimate all models
including a variable indicating whether an individual feels Scottish/more Scottish
in 1999 (treating perceived nationality as time-invariant). Although this variable
generally enters all models with statistically signicant positive coe¢ cients, our
results and conclusions remain unaltered.
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Figure 1. Evolution of Political Party Support by Gender
Labour SNP
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Figure 2. Evolution of Party Support by Gender (Partisans)
Labour SNP
Conservative Lib Dem/Lib/SDP
other party/none/do not know
Figures 1 and 2 display the longitudinal evolution of aggregate political party
support from the entire sample (non-partisan and partisan) and from the partisan
subsample, respectively. Figure 1 reveals that the incumbent Labour party is the
majority party, while the SNP is the second most popular party regarding both
genders throughout the period, being Labour support generally higher among fe-
male respondents and SNP support higher among male respondents. Considering
only partisan respondents, Figure 2 reveals that the SNP remains the second most
supported party only among male partisans and falls to the third place (behind the
Conservative party) among female partisans. That men are markedly more likely
than women to support the SNP is a well known feature of the Scottish electorate,
but empirical works trying to explain it are scarce. Using the 2007 Scottish Elec-
tion Study and the SNP membership survey, Johns et al. (2011) nd that the main
factor explaining the gender gap in SNP support is that women are less supportive
of independence.
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2.2. Egocentric Economic Evaluations
Economic voting models establish that changes in the relative popularity of the
incumbent government/opposition party are inuenced by voters perceptions of
economic conditions. Depending on the model specication, these perceptions can
be about current, past or future economic conditions. There are two dimensions
of economic evaluations: egocentric/egotropic (about the personal economic situ-
ation) and sociotropic (about national economic conditions). The BHPS includes
three questions about egocentric economic perceptions referring to the respondents
current, past and future nancial situations, but unfortunately it does not include
sociotropic questions. The existing empirical evidence, however, suggests that so-
ciotropic evaluations have little e¤ect on political support since they are strongly
conditioned by party a¢ liation and prior opinions of the incumbent ruling party
(see Evans and Andersen, 2006; Evans and Pickup, 2010).5
As Sanders and Brynin (1999) and Johnston et al. (2005) we include the current,
retrospective and prospective egocentric economic evaluations. These measures, be-
ing of subjective nature, might be determined by individual attitudes (more or less
optimistic personalities). Since egocentric economic evaluations are likely to be
conditioned by personal experiences (see for instance, Evans and Andersen, 2006)
we explicitly induce a correlation between the evaluations and unobserved het-
erogeneity by adding the individual-specic time-averages of egocentric economic
evaluations. In addition, as a robustness check, we use annual equivalent household
income (and its individual-specic time-average) as an objective income measure
in the place of perceived current nancial situation. The objective income mea-
sure e¤ectively reproduces the impact of the subjective current nancial situation
measure.6 ;7
3. ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY
The empirical strategy is based on testing the impact of egocentric economic
evaluations (retrospective, current and prospective) in a dynamic longitudinal model
of political party support, accounting for initial political sentiments and time-
varying political party attachment. Accordingly, we consider the dynamic binary
party support model
yit = 1 (y

it > 0) ; y

it = xit+yit 1 + "i + it; t = 2; :::; Ti; i = 1; :::; N ; (1)
where yit is a binary latent variable capturing political party support propensity.
Individual i in period t is observed to be a supporter of a given party, as opposed
to any other political party, if yit (which can also be interpreted as the specic
party related benets) crosses the zero threshold. The vector  =(; ) represents
the unknown parameters to be estimated and xit is a vector of contemporaneous
explanatory variables for the ith voter in the tth time period. The composite
error term in (1), it = "i + it, captures the unobserved heterogeneity underlying
individual party support preferences, being decomposed into an individual-specic
component f"igi=1;:::;N and an individual time-specic e¤ect it.
The explanatory variables in xit include the strong party support(political
party attachment) variable and the three (current, retrospective, prospective) ego-
centric economic perception variables described in the previous section, together
with their respective individual-specic time-averages. All models incorporate a
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standard set of socioeconomic control variables. These include age group, marital
status, employment status, university degree, an indicator of self-reported health,
number of children, outright/mortgage house ownership and respective Scottish
local authority.
Unlike earlier studies such as Evans and Andersen (2006), Johnston et al. (2005)
and Sanders and Brynin (1999) we undertake estimations for male and female vot-
ers separately for three important reasons. Primarily, the longitudinal evolution of
political party support (Figures 1 and 2) indicates higher male SNP support fre-
quencies during the entire period under analysis. Secondly, the normality assump-
tion for the unobserved individual heterogeneity underlying heterogeneous political
preferences (see eq.(3)) is more likely to be met when employing a rather homoge-
neous sample. Thirdly, recent studies such as Dhaval et al. (2016) indicate distinct
female voting participation patterns and di¤erential gender-related determinants of
voting preferences.
3.1. Initial Conditions
We date observations starting at t = 0 so that the rst self-reported politi-
cal party supported by the ith individual is yi0. Given a random draw i from
the underlying population and t = 1; 2; :::; T , and assuming it in equation (1) is
an iid idiosyncratic error disturbance with cdf F conditional on "i, the dynamic
unobserved e¤ects model for individual party support is
Pr(yit = 1jyit 1; :::; yi0;xi; "i) = F (xit+yit 1 + "i); t = 1; :::; Ti: (2)
It is assumed that "i is additive inside the cdf and that upon conditioning on
the vector of contemporaneous explanatory variables xit and "i, the dynamics are
of rst-order.8 Treating "i as a random (unobserved) variable drawn with (yi;xi);
and assuming "ijxi s N(0; 2"), provides consistent parameter estimates only in the
case of a static model. Including yt 1 raises the question of how we treat yi0, i.e.,
the initial conditions problem (Heckman 1981a,b).9
The presence of "i in equation (2) invalidates the assumption of exogeneity of
party support in 1999 since the start of the sample is unlikely to coincide with the
initiation of the stochastic process determining party support preferences. State de-
pendence and individual heterogeneity o¤er "diametrically opposite" explanations
of habit persistence (Hsiao, 2003, p.216). Considering otherwise identical individu-
als, it is possible that those who have supported a particular party in the past will
amend their preferences determining propensities towards future voting intentions
(the so-called swing voters): an entirely behavioural e¤ect that could be attributed
to approval/disapproval of party policies.10
Alternatively, individuals may di¤er in specic unobservables a¤ecting their
probability of political a¢ liation, while at the same time not being inuenced by
previous voting behaviour or party performance. If such unobservables are corre-
lated over time, and are not appropriately controlled for, past party support may
turn out to be the overriding determinant of future support preferences, since it
acts as proxy for the temporally persistent unobservables. This is what Heckman
(1981a, 1981b) terms as "spurious state dependence" as opposed to "true (struc-
tural) state dependence".
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TABLE 3.— MALE VOTERS:  POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT TRANSITION PROBABILITIES MATRIX, (1999-2006)
PARTY SUPPORTED PARTY SUPPORTED: frequency (transition count), Prob(yi ,t+1 = vs|yi ,t = vr)
frequency (transition count)
Conservative Labour Lib dem /Lib/SDP SNP other none TOTAL
Conservative 487 22 14 16 7 25 571
85.29 3.85 2.45 2.8 1.23 4.38 100
Labour 23 1,570 48 90 27 52 1,810
1.27 86.74 2.65 4.97 1.49 2.87 100
Lib dem /Lib/SDP 10 36 355 17 7 8 433
2.31 8.31 81.99 3.93 1.62 1.85 100
SNP 15 103 30 860 20 31 1,059
1.42 9.73 2.83 81.21 1.89 2.93 100
other 8 16 8 8 70 10 120
6.67 13.33 6.67 6.67 58.33 8.33 100
none 14 38 9 25 8 170 264
5.3 14.39 3.41 9.47 3.03 64.39 100
TOTAL (t>1999): 557 1,785 464 1,016 139 296 4,257
Party support 2000-2006 13.08 41.93 10.9 23.87 3.27 6.95 100
1. Source: University of Essex, ISER, BHPS, Waves 9-16. 2. Other: Plaid Cymru/Green/Other Party/other answer.
3. Off-diagonal row (r)/column (s) elements denote total voter outflow/inflow during (1999-2006), respectively.
4. r=1,… ,R and s=1,… .,S denote party preference (or other response), (v); r=s along the main diagonal, only.
5. Sample includes individuals with Ti>2 and no missing values in any of the covariates in the (full sample compact unbalanced) estimations provided in Table 5.
Voting preferences stem from two sources: an ideological component and a policy
component. Partisan votersvoting preferences are formed on the basis of both ide-
ological and policy related grounds with the weight of each determinant depending
on the strength of individual-specic party bias. Non-partisans on the other hand,
being ideologically neutral, will swing exclusively in response to government policies
(see Liberini et al., p.46, 2017). As indicated by the transition probability matri-
ces for the entire electorate (Tables 3 and 4) initial party preferences are strongly
persistent. There is, however, a non-negligible degree of variation in party prefer-
ences. The respective partisan transition matrices clearly indicate that swinging,
though still present, is far less common among partisan voters (Appendix, Tables
A16 A17). Accordingly, it is expected that the impact of swing voting (captured
by yt 1) will diminish among the partisan electorate since their initial period party
preferences are far more persistent: this is indeed veried by comparing the partial
e¤ects of yt 1 for the entire electorate to the corresponding partisan-only estimates
(Tables 9-11).
Wooldridge (2005) proposes specifying a distribution of " conditional on y0,
as opposed to Heckmans (1981b) proposal to obtain the joint distribution of all
outcomes of the endogenous variables. We employ Wooldridges (2005) solution
to the initial conditions problem due to its computational simplicity. Using the
Mundlak (1978)-Chamberlain (1984) specication we induce a correlation between
"i and the time means of the nonredundant, i.e. time-varying, explanatory variables
taking the form of "i = xia + i, where i  iid N(0; 2) and is independent of
(xit; it) for all (i, t).
11
9
TABLE 4.— FEMALE VOTERS:  POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT TRANSITION PROBABILITIES MATRIX, (1999-2006)
PARTY SUPPORTED PARTY SUPPORTED: frequency (transition count), Prob(yi ,t+1 = vs|yi ,t = vr)
frequency (transition count)
Conservative Labour Lib dem /Lib/SDP SNP other none TOTAL
Conservative 669 25 39 14 3 24 774
86.43 3.23 5.04 1.81 0.39 3.1 100
Labour 14 1,786 50 93 14 57 2,014
0.7 88.68 2.48 4.62 0.7 2.83 100
Lib dem /Lib/SDP 30 36 464 19 4 12 565
5.31 6.37 82.12 3.36 0.71 2.12 100
SNP 10 100 21 726 16 51 924
1.08 10.82 2.27 78.57 1.73 5.52 100
other 3 17 8 11 65 6 110
2.73 15.45 7.27 10 59.09 5.45 100
none 18 51 12 32 4 161 278
6.47 18.35 4.32 11.51 1.44 57.91 100
TOTAL (t>1999): 744 2,015 594 895 106 311 4,665
Party support 2000-2006 15.95 43.19 12.73 19.19 2.27 6.67 100
1. Source: University of Essex, ISER, BHPS, Waves 9-16. 2. Other: Green/Other Party/other answer.
3. Off-diagonal row (r)/column (s) elements denote total voter outflow/inflow during (1999-2006), respectively.
4. r=1,… ,R and s=1,… .,S denote party preference (or other response), (v); r=s along the main diagonal, only.
5. Sample includes individuals with Ti>2 and no missing values in any of the covariates in the (full sample compact unbalanced) estimations provided in Table 6.
Under the normality assumption, the distribution of i in its simplest form is
ijyi0;xi  N(0+ 1yi0; 2#) where, i=0+ 1yi0+#i and #ij (yi0;xi)  N(0; 2#).
The sample log-likelihood for the dynamic correlated random e¤ects (CRE) probit
model corresponds to
ln(L) =
NX
i=1
(
ln
Z " TY
t=1
[ (xit+yit 1 + 0 + 1yi0 + xia+ #)]
yit
[1   (xit+yit 1 + 0 + 1yi0 + xia+ #)]1 yit
i 1
#



#
#

d#

; (3)
where it is assumed that itj (xi; yit 1; :::; yi0; #i)  N(0; 1) and (; ) denote the
cdf and pdf of the standard Normal, respectively. Importantly, controlling for initial
conditions alone does not remove the dependence among yit 1 and #i. While in
the random e¤ects model #i is integrated out from the likelihood in eq.(3), pooled
probit estimation is inconsistent as it ignores the presence of #i.12
Adopting the Mundlak (1978)-Chamberlain (1984) specication, the explana-
tory variables at time t are sit  (1; xit; yit 1; yi0; xi) where xi = T 1i
PTi
t=1 xit
as suggested by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2013).13 Including time-constant ex-
planatory variables in xit merely increases the explanatory power of the model
since it is not possible to separately identify their partial e¤ects from their partial
correlation with the unobserved e¤ect. Note that due to minimal within variation,
we are unable to include individual-specic time means of regional and educational
variables.
3.2. Estimation Samples: Attrition, the Scottish Extension Sample
and Sampling Weights
In forming unbalanced panels we analyse contiguous sequences of non-missing
data with T > 3 pertaining to the sample in 1999 i.e., individuals can exit the
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sample after 2001 but cannot enter ex post 1999. Such a sample selection mechanism
is used for example by Arulampalam et al. (2000) and Contoyannis et al. (2004),
and suggested by Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2014).14 An alternative is to employ
balanced panels since under independence among the sample selection rule and
idiosyncratic shocks to yit, the MLE is consistent provided that the initial conditions
are appropriately dealt with (see Wooldridge, 2005). However, balancing entails
e¢ ciency losses due to discarding information, while in some cases balanced samples
may contain an insu¢ cient number of cross-sectional units across all time periods.
In fact, regarding the entire electorate we estimate using balanced and compact
unbalanced panels, though in the partisan subsamples we only perform unbalanced
estimations due to insu¢ cient observations.15
A further issue requiring particular attention is the use of the Scottish extension
sample, noting that without doing so an independent country-level analysis would
not have been possible.16 Since our estimation samples include original BHPS mem-
bers entering the sample before 1999, the assumption that initial observations stem
from the same exogenous distribution or selection rule becomes questionable. In
response to this, we also report estimates inclusive of an original sample member-
ship dummy. In addition, we separately estimate models for the extension sample,
but only for the entire electorate due to insu¢ cient number of cross-sectional units
over time in the subsamples.
Finally, we perform estimations using the available longitudinal sampling weights
(from the latest wave in the sequence) to account for the di¤erent sample selection
probabilities within the whole BHPS. These weights are proportional to the inverse
of the selection probability per sampling unit, 1= bpit.17 ;18
Under the ignorability assumption, initial period 1999 variables (zi0) determine
attrition su¢ ciently well so that responses sit 2 f0; 1g and covariates in the follow-
ing periods are ignorable, that is
P (sit = 1jyit; yit 1;xit; zi0) = P (sit = 1jzi0); (t = 1; :::; T ) : (4)
Provided the assumption of selection on observables in equation (4) holds, maximum
likelihood estimation using
ln(L) =
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
(sit=cpit) ln(Lit) (5)
is asymptotically e¢ cient and
p
N -consistent (see Wooldridge, 2002, pp.125-6).19 ;20
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS
We start this Section with the analysis of the initial estimation results and
the average partial e¤ects (APEs) of the key determinants of SNP support, which
include egocentric economic evaluations. We then use an alternative specication of
the dependent variable to examine incumbent Labour Party support determinants.
Finally, we test the economic voting hypothesis over the two intervening electoral
cycles, 1999  2002 and 2003  2006.
4.1. Observed Heterogeneity
The estimation results for the joint and partisan samples are given in Tables
5-6 and Table 7, respectively. They clearly indicate a key set of determinants of
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political party support with varying e¤ects by both partisanship and gender. These
consist of previous period support, initial period support, strong party support and
a combination of egocentric economic evaluation variables. A detailed analysis is
undertaken employing the more informative APEs in the following Section.
The coe¢ cients of initial SNP support enter all estimations with particularly
strong and statistically signicant e¤ects that are much greater in magnitude than
the coe¢ cients of lagged support. This indicates a considerable correlation between
the unobserved individual heterogeneity and the initial condition, which is notably
accentuated among the partisan electorate. As a robustness test, we also estimate
all models including a variable indicating whether an individual feels Scottish/more
Scottish in 1999 (treating perceived nationality as time-invariant). Perceived na-
tionality in 1999 enters the estimations with generally statistically signicant posi-
tive coe¢ cients, slightly reducing the estimated coe¢ cients of initial SNP support
and having a negligible e¤ect on lagged SNP support. There is no discernible
pattern regarding the remaining variablescoe¢ cients and our conclusions remain
unaltered (Appendix, Tables A13 A15).
Independently of gender, the Glasgow regional control enters most estimations
with sizeable negative e¤ects on SNP support. University educated males are less
probable to support the SNP (Table 5), whereas employed females are more likely
to do so (Table 6). However, these educational and employment e¤ects generally
become statistically insignicant in the partisan estimates (Table 7). Other socioe-
conomic controls like self-assessed health and the number of children inuence male
and female support probabilities in opposite directions, though in the female case
they are not always statistically signicant. Males above 44 years old are less likely
to support the SNP, but age is generally insignicant for females.
Finally, retrospective and prospective personal nancial perceptions seem more
important determinants of SNP support than current perceptions. As a robustness
check, we also employ the (objective) annual equivalent household income (and its
individual-specic time-average) instead of the subjective current nancial situation
measure and nd that the corresponding estimates (Appendix, Tables A10 A12)
display no signicant variation and are qualitatively similar to those in Tables
5  7.21
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TABLE 5.— MALE DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged SNP Support 0.658*** 0.658*** 0.712*** 0.690*** 0.727*** 0.727*** 0.761*** 0.751***
SNP Supporter (1999) 3.417*** 3.408*** 3.405*** 3.473*** 3.467*** 3.471*** 3.344*** 3.403***
Strong Party Support 0.265* 0.264* 0.306* 0.301* 0.367** 0.367** 0.416* 0.399**
m(Strong Party Support) 0.558** 0.557** 0.506* 0.583** 0.558* 0.556* 0.357 0.595*
     Age 25-34 -0.449 -0.448 -0.278 -0.492 -0.227 -0.229 -0.264 -0.174
     Age 35-44 -0.361 -0.360 -0.517 -0.623* -0.384 -0.386 -0.883* -0.431
     Age >44 -0.628* -0.627* -0.576 -0.923** -0.509 -0.511 -0.787 -0.607
Married/Civil Partnership 0.259 0.258 -0.127 0.318 -0.184 -0.182 -0.335 0.074
m(Married/Civil Partnership) 0.098 0.099 0.604 0.181 0.689 0.687 0.969* 0.439
Employed/Self-employed -0.106 -0.106 -0.016 0.077 0.028 0.028 0.135 0.049
m(Employed/Self-employed) 0.236 0.237 0.142 -0.048 0.071 0.069 -0.277 0.125
University Qualifications -0.578*** -0.576*** -0.594*** -0.632*** -0.829*** -0.827*** -0.912*** -0.809***
Excellent,Good/Very Good Health -0.131 -0.132 -0.281* -0.066 -0.173 -0.172 -0.351* -0.096
m(Excellent,Good/Very Good Health) 0.551** 0.544* 0.777*** 0.546* 0.808** 0.810** 1.055*** 0.954**
Number of Children 0.312* 0.311* 0.381** 0.337* 0.515*** 0.515*** 0.507** 0.399*
m(Number of Children) -0.418** -0.408* -0.476** -0.389 -0.640*** -0.644*** -0.578** -0.517*
Own House/Mortage 0.059 0.059 0.011 0.007 0.176 0.177 0.122 0.122
m(Own House/Mortage) -0.133 -0.132 -0.118 -0.007 -0.075 -0.074 -0.022 0.088
Region: Scottish Local Authority
    Glasgow -0.576* -0.596* -0.380 -0.480 -0.770* -0.762* -0.420 -0.535
    Lothians -0.232 -0.235 -0.101 -0.124 -0.260 -0.257 -0.252 0.070
    Highlands, Islands -0.008 -0.035 0.018 0.156 -0.598 -0.589 -0.723 -0.399
    Central 0.036 0.036 0.089 0.196 0.110 0.110 0.195 0.483
    West -0.088 -0.086 -0.028 0.078 -0.427 -0.426 -0.373 -0.299
    South 0.188 0.207 0.262 0.416 -0.566* -0.572* -0.414 -0.487
    Mid-Scotland, Fife 0.086 0.082 0.094 0.072 0.149 0.150 0.131 0.377
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially 0.032 0.032 -0.012 0.044 0.315 0.315 0.228 0.195
    m(Comfortably Financially) 0.148 0.141 0.135 1.088 -1.207 -1.207 -1.059 0.215
    Alright Financially 0.013 0.014 -0.125 0.045 0.267 0.267 0.073 0.222
    m(Alright Financially) 0.233 0.231 0.059 1.088* -0.982 -0.983 -0.933 0.241
    Just Getting by Financially -0.084 -0.083 -0.222 -0.053 -0.126 -0.127 -0.265 -0.150
    m(Getting by Financially) 0.570 0.554 0.660 1.395** -0.294 -0.292 -0.022 0.865
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year -0.172 -0.172 -0.196 -0.309** -0.042 -0.042 -0.091 -0.193
    m(Better Finances vs last year) -0.249 -0.237 -0.218 -0.436 -0.207 -0.209 -0.381 -0.887
    Worse Finances vs last year 0.247* 0.248* 0.229* 0.318** 0.276 0.276 0.255 0.292
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) -0.461 -0.446 -0.559 -0.203 -0.916 -0.922 -0.818 -0.862
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances 0.187 0.187 0.207 0.210 0.264** 0.264** 0.283* 0.331**
    m(Expect Better Finances) 0.417 0.406 0.488 0.617 0.509 0.513 0.710 1.248*
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances -0.233 -0.233 -0.202 -0.391** -0.182 -0.182 -0.173 -0.243
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) 1.467*** 1.473*** 1.779*** 1.750*** 1.566** 1.565** 1.834** 2.281***
Original Sample Member -0.120 0.036
Constant -3.320*** -3.288*** -3.396*** -4.354*** -2.670*** -2.676*** -2.353*** -4.373***
Log-Likelihood -916.571 -916.372 -937.443 -726.462 -610.928 -610.918 -635.093 -490.881
Sample Size 4,257 4,257 4,257 3,334 2,954 2,954 2,954 2,324
Wald (Global Significance) 450.526*** 457.981*** 422.256*** 346.437*** 329.522*** 341.273*** 309.251*** 264.202***
Intra-Class Correlation 0.631*** 0.631*** 0.635*** 0.654*** 0.645*** 0.645*** 0.619*** 0.646***
1. Source: University of Essex, ISER, BHPS, Waves 9-16. 2. Standard Errors are adjusted for individual level (within person) clustering. 3. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
4. Unbalanced panels (I-IV) are compact; Extension (IV, VIII): Scotland extension sample; Full sample (I-III, V-VII): Original BHPS sample + Scotland extension sample; All models include time dummies.
5. Weights: `w´LRWTSW2 respondent weight from the latest wave,` w ,´ in longitudinal sequence (see "The BHPS User Documentation - Volume A: User Guide", Table 25).
6. CRE: Correlated Random Effects; m(var) denotes the individual specific (within) mean of the respective time-varying variable (var), for Ti in [2,Ti].
7. Reference Groups: Age [16-25); Marital Status: Separated/Divorced/Widowed/ Never Married; Highest Qualification: HND, HNC, Teaching/A Level/O Level/CSE/none of these;
Current Economic Activity: Unemployed/Retired/Family Care/Full Time Student/Long Term Sick, Disabled/Gvt Training Scheme/Other;
Self-Assessed Health: Very Poor, Poor/Fair Health; Housing Tenure: Local Authority/Housing Association Rent/Rented House; Region: North East Scotland;
Current Financial Status: Finding it Quite/Very Difficult; Change in Financial Position Versus Last Year:  About the Same; Financial Expectations: About the Same.
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TABLE 6.— FEMALE DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged SNP Support 0.524*** 0.526*** 0.525*** 0.520*** 0.399** 0.403** 0.354** 0.291
SNP Supporter (1999) 3.537*** 3.526*** 3.482*** 3.619*** 3.931*** 3.892*** 4.071*** 4.096***
Strong Party Support 0.422*** 0.422*** 0.390*** 0.480*** 0.541*** 0.540*** 0.552*** 0.703***
m(Strong Party Support) -0.241 -0.241 -0.029 -0.315 -0.060 -0.042 0.438 -0.156
     Age 25-34 -0.037 -0.040 0.149 0.254 -0.175 -0.158 -0.058 -0.152
     Age 35-44 -0.057 -0.069 0.196 0.235 -0.025 -0.038 0.059 -0.110
     Age >44 0.328 0.321 0.522 0.591 0.215 0.213 0.324 0.160
Married/Civil Partnership -0.151 -0.152 -0.171 0.193 -0.287 -0.285 -0.036 0.039
m(Married/Civil Partnership) -0.041 -0.039 -0.079 -0.426 0.165 0.155 -0.156 -0.177
Employed/Self-employed 0.455** 0.455** 0.371* 0.427* 0.404** 0.400** 0.281 0.398*
m(Employed/Self-employed) 0.035 0.041 0.321 0.031 -0.106 -0.105 0.429 -0.029
University Qualifications -0.206 -0.201 -0.357* -0.158 -0.444 -0.432 -0.517 -0.407
Excellent,Good/Very Good Health 0.012 0.012 0.073 -0.029 -0.076 -0.077 0.002 -0.033
m(Excellent,Good/Very Good Health) -0.418* -0.431* -0.561** -0.471* -0.386 -0.422 -0.678 -0.628
Number of Children -0.084 -0.083 -0.082 -0.107 -0.332* -0.331* -0.323* -0.399*
m(Number of Children) 0.136 0.141 0.230 0.231 0.379 0.406* 0.570** 0.590**
Own House/Mortage 0.279 0.277 0.053 0.084 0.288 0.288 0.057 0.021
m(Own House/Mortage) -0.753** -0.746** -0.408 -0.527 -0.848* -0.775* -0.429 -0.613
Region: Scottish Local Authority
    Glasgow -0.372 -0.400 -0.463* -0.542* -0.705* -0.787** -0.484 -0.882*
    Lothians -0.129 -0.137 -0.001 -0.336 -0.337 -0.389 -0.359 -0.436
    Highlands, Islands 0.424 0.394 0.479 0.238 -0.045 -0.133 -0.107 -0.363
    Central 0.297 0.300 0.333 0.108 -0.027 0.005 0.142 -0.086
    West 0.208 0.205 0.310 0.109 0.091 0.103 0.272 0.164
    South 0.287 0.300 0.231 0.156 0.144 0.146 0.235 -0.176
    Mid-Scotland, Fife 0.120 0.108 0.289 -0.038 -0.210 -0.228 0.164 -0.490
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially -0.071 -0.071 0.033 -0.088 -0.099 -0.099 0.008 0.112
    m(Comfortably Financially) 0.712 0.717 0.517 1.363** 0.594 0.468 -0.303 1.247
    Alright Financially 0.074 0.074 0.170 0.042 0.164 0.162 0.300 0.308
    m(Alright Financially) 0.490 0.500 0.376 0.986* 0.652 0.600 -0.167 1.189
    Just Getting by Financially 0.057 0.057 0.077 0.071 0.286 0.282 0.274 0.461
    m(Getting by Financially) 0.293 0.298 0.157 0.621 -0.420 -0.498 -1.282 -0.029
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year -0.229* -0.230* -0.249* -0.218 -0.157 -0.155 -0.071 -0.142
    m(Better Finances vs last year) -0.066 -0.071 0.272 -0.404 -0.605 -0.569 -0.090 -1.077
    Worse Finances vs last year -0.125 -0.126 -0.081 -0.150 -0.101 -0.101 -0.013 -0.120
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) 0.575 0.580 0.794 0.735 0.439 0.459 0.707 0.566
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances 0.224* 0.224* 0.142 0.153 0.116 0.118 0.013 -0.028
    m(Expect Better Finances) 0.207 0.197 -0.018 0.677* 0.742 0.653 -0.012 1.147
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances 0.138 0.137 0.164 0.128 0.123 0.120 0.106 0.160
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) -0.392 -0.391 -0.596 -0.350 0.201 0.305 -0.629 -0.369
Original Sample Member -0.126 -0.426*
Constant -3.181*** -3.137***  -3.495*** -3.875*** -3.192*** -3.017***  -3.147*** -3.699***
Log-Likelihood -928.617 -928.34 -845.131 -710.142 -547.611 -546.369 -474.764 -432.349
Sample Size 4,665 4,665 4,665 3,453 2,961 2,961 2,961 2,177
Wald (Global Significance) 464.673 466.832 427.757 350.564 284.344 289.095 252.865 204.231
Intra-Class Correlation 0.614*** 0.612*** 0.601*** 0.626*** 0.660*** 0.654*** 0.686*** 0.699***
1. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 5 also apply here.
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TABLE 7.— PARTISAN DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
Unbalanced (I-VI) I II III IV V VI
Baseline (Male) Sample Dummy (Male) Weights (Male) Baseline (Female) Sample Dummy (Female) Weights (Female)
Lagged SNP Support 0.766*** 0.769*** 0.941*** 0.707** 0.708** 0.707**
SNP Supporter (1999) 6.271*** 6.234*** 6.566*** 6.078*** 6.070*** 6.075***
Strong Party Support 0.487* 0.486* 0.557* 0.187 0.187 0.222
m(Strong Party Support) 0.519 0.507 0.561 -0.256 -0.260 -0.162
     Age 25-34 -0.073 -0.067 -0.184 0.470 0.482 1.033
     Age 35-44 -0.392 -0.394 -0.325 0.475 0.486 1.142
     Age >44 -0.891 -0.898 -0.648 0.819 0.834 1.402*
Married/Civil Partnership -0.103 -0.105 0.039 -0.291 -0.293 -0.305
m(Married/Civil Partnership) 1.245** 1.245** 1.093* 0.161 0.156 0.195
Employed/Self-employed -0.011 -0.012 0.120 0.205 0.206 0.349
m(Employed/Self-employed) 0.514 0.509 0.251 -0.284 -0.276 -0.425
University Qualifications -0.548 -0.540 -0.469 -0.404 -0.412 -0.773*
Excellent,Good/Very Good Health -0.250 -0.251 -0.466 -0.223 -0.223 -0.302
m(Excellent,Good/Very Good Health) 0.904* 0.896* 1.667*** -0.154 -0.160 0.213
Number of Children 0.915*** 0.914*** 1.031*** -0.076 -0.076 -0.034
m(Number of Children) -1.480*** -1.463*** -1.553*** -0.137 -0.125 -0.114
Own House/Mortage 0.202 0.201 -0.554 0.433 0.428 0.240
m(Own House/Mortage) -0.587 -0.585 0.328 -0.897 -0.875 -0.679
Region: Scottish Local Authority
    Glasgow -1.701*** -1.721*** -1.741*** -1.082* -1.101* -1.651***
    Lothians -0.530 -0.550 -0.248 -0.353 -0.368 -0.543
    Highlands, Islands 0.160 0.121 0.051 -0.164 -0.194 -0.541
    Central -0.386 -0.384 -0.125 -0.508 -0.502 -0.721
    West -0.563 -0.565 -0.380 -0.497 -0.488 -0.558
    South 0.097 0.131 0.185 0.391 0.398 0.197
    Mid-Scotland, Fife 0.144 0.141 -0.120 0.049 0.026 -0.048
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially -0.209 -0.208 -0.393 -0.088 -0.088 -0.016
    m(Comfortably Financially) 0.854 0.838 1.298 1.414 1.416 1.492*
    Alright Financially 0.438 0.439 0.263 0.053 0.053 0.148
    m(Alright Financially) 1.075 1.067 1.239 1.966** 1.981** 2.010**
    Just Getting by Financially 0.128 0.130 0.014 -0.148 -0.147 -0.223
    m(Getting by Financially) 1.627 1.600 2.183 1.006 1.002 0.633
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year -0.028 -0.028 -0.137 -0.387* -0.386* -0.549**
    m(Better Finances vs last year) -1.275 -1.266 -1.245 0.894 0.891 1.065
    Worse Finances vs last year 0.389 0.388 0.432 -0.192 -0.192 -0.097
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) -0.732 -0.716 -0.929 1.100 1.095 0.856
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances 0.082 0.082 0.052 0.332 0.332 0.396*
    m(Expect Better Finances) 1.417* 1.410* 1.288* 0.649 0.621 0.548
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances -0.015 -0.016 0.023 0.091 0.090 0.080
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) 0.616 0.619 1.364 -0.893 -0.867 -0.282
Original Sample Member -0.155 -0.114
Constant -6.123*** -6.041*** -7.306*** -5.702*** -5.684*** -6.299***
Log-Likelihood -270.505 -270.431 -252.874 -309.606 -309.562 -259.165
Sample Size 2,384 2,384 2,384 2,687 2,687 2,687
Wald (Global Significance) 174.043 182.586 189.500 174.051 180.224 192.012
Intra-Class Correlation 0.764*** 0.763*** 0.779*** 0.774*** 0.773*** 0.745***
1. Source: University of Essex, ISER, BHPS, Waves 9-16. 2. Standard Errors are adjusted for individual level (within person) clustering. 3. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
4. All samples are compact unbalanced panels; Full sample (I-VI): Original BHPS sample + Scotland extension sample; All models include time dummies.
5. Weights: `w´LRWTSW2 respondent weight from the latest wave,`w ,´ in longitudinal sequence (see "The BHPS User Documentation - Volume A: User Guide", Table 25).
6. CRE: Correlated Random Effects; m(var) denotes the individual specific (within) mean of the respective time-varying variable (var), for Ti in [2,Ti].
7. Reference Groups: Age [16-25); Marital Status: Separated/Divorced/Widowed/ Never Married; Highest Qualification: HND, HNC, Teaching/A Level/O Level/CSE/none of these;
Current Economic Activity: Unemployed/Retired/Family Care/Full Time Student/Long Term Sick, Disabled/Gvt Training Scheme/Other;
Self-Assessed Health: Very Poor, Poor/Fair Health; Housing Tenure: Local Authority/Housing Association Rent/Rented House; Region: North East Scotland;
Current Financial Status: Finding it Quite/Very Difficult; Change in Financial Position Versus Last Year:  About the Same; Financial Expectations: About the Same.
4.2. Average Partial E¤ects
Given the nonlinear nature of the CRE probit models the estimated parameters
are only informative regarding the direction and relative e¤ects of the covariates. To
obtain a clear quantitative interpretation of the e¤ects of key explanatory variables
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on the probability of SNP support we estimate the APEs based on
E [ (xit+yit 1 + 0 + 1yi0 + xia+ #i)] ; (6)
where the expectation is over the distribution of (yi0;xi; #i). A consistent estimator
is
N 1
NX
i=1


xitb#+b#yit 1 + b0# + b1#yi0 + xiba# ; (7)
where b = b=
q
(1+b2#) denotes a population-averaged parameter across the dis-
tribution of , b =
b; b;b0;b1; ba, and b; b; b0; b1; ba and b2# are the MLEs (see
Wooldridge, 2005).22
We calculate changes of expression (7) with respect to selected elements of xit
and yit 1 to obtain the APEs given in Tables 8-11. We provide bootstrapped
standard errors for the APEs using 250 bootstrap replications by resampling with
replacement accounting for individual-level clustering. The only exception are the
CRE estimations with sampling weights, where we perform 100 bootstrap replica-
tions.23
The strong statistical signicance of the initial value of party support in Tables
5-7 indicates that initial conditions are clearly endogenous. However, accounting
for initial conditions alone still provides inconsistent parameter estimates when #i is
ignored by employing pooled estimation. This translates into particularly inated
APEs for lagged party support (overstating the role of swing voting) in Table 8, as
opposed to the consistent CRE estimates given in Tables 9-11.
TABLE 8.— POOLED PROBIT AVERAGE PARTIAL EFFECTS OF LAGGED SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
UNBALANCED BALANCED
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
No initial conditions
Male Voters 0.734*** 0.732*** 0.737*** 0.735*** 0.741*** 0.739*** 0.734*** 0.734***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.032)
Female Voters 0.716*** 0.714*** 0.716*** 0.711*** 0.711*** 0.705*** 0.718*** 0.697***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.030) (0.032) (0.034) (0.038)
Partisan Males 0.871*** 0.868*** 0.880***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.021)
Partisan Females 0.835*** 0.834*** 0.840***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
Initial conditions
Male Voters 0.439*** 0.439*** 0.457*** 0.460*** 0.475*** 0.474*** 0.465*** 0.476***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.044) (0.046) (0.047) (0.051) (0.053)
Female Voters 0.370*** 0.369*** 0.365*** 0.374*** 0.362*** 0.354*** 0.365*** 0.369***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.045) (0.043) (0.046) (0.045) (0.052) (0.053)
Partisan Males 0.468*** 0.468*** 0.504***
(0.075) (0.074) (0.081)
Partisan Females 0.444*** 0.443*** 0.402***
(0.083) (0.083) (0.081)
1. The corresponding estimates (and sample sizes) are provided in Tables A1-A6 in the Appendix.
2. Bootstrapped standard errors accounting for individual-level clustering. 3. (I-VIII): 250 bootstrap replications. 4. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
The most prominent APEs in the joint sample estimates generally stem from
lagged SNP support. The magnitude of state dependence is markedly greater in
the male estimates (Table 9), where previous period SNP support increases the
probability of present support between 7 (unbalanced panels) and 8 (balanced pan-
els) percentage points, whereas in the female estimates (Table 10) this e¤ect varies
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between 5 (unbalanced panels) and 3 (balanced panels) points. In contrast, strong
party support has a greater e¤ect among the female electorate, noting that in the
balanced female estimates the respective APEs surpass the lagged support partial
e¤ects. As indicated by (Table 6), balanced panel induced attrition diminishes the
role of state dependence in female SNP support and augments the role of initial
and strong party support.
TABLE 9.— MALE CRE PROBIT AVERAGE PARTIAL EFFECTS ON THE PROBABILITY OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
UNBALANCED BALANCED
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Lagged SNP Support 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.078*** 0.073*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.086*** 0.082***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.011) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.016) (0.030)
Strong Party Support 0.024* 0.024* 0.028** 0.027* 0.033** 0.033** 0.039** 0.037**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
Employed/Self-employed -0.010 -0.010 -0.001 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.013 0.004
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.024)
University Qualifications -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.052*** -0.055*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.080** -0.070***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.027)
Glasgow -0.050* -0.052** -0.034 -0.042 -0.064* -0.064* -0.037 -0.047
(0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.031) (0.038) (0.038) (0.047) (0.046)
Comfortably Financially 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.004 0.028 0.028 0.021 0.018
(0.022) (0.022) (0.016) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.023) (0.034)
Alright Financially 0.001 0.001 -0.011 0.004 0.024 0.024 0.007 0.02
(0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.032)
Just Getting by Financially -0.008 -0.007 -0.020 -0.005 -0.011 -0.011 -0.024 -0.014
(0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.018) (0.027)
Better Finances vs last year -0.015 -0.015 -0.018** -0.027* -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -0.017
(0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018)
Worse Finances vs last year 0.023* 0.023* 0.021** 0.029* 0.025 0.025 0.024* 0.027
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.020)
Expect Better Finances 0.017 0.017 0.019* 0.019 0.024** 0.024** 0.027* 0.031**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances -0.021 -0.021 -0.018 -0.034** -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.022
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019)
Sample-Size 4,257 4,257 4,257 3,334 2,954 2,954 2,954 2,324
1. Average partial effects, for selected variables, on the probability of SNP support employing the CRE estimates in Table 5.
2. Bootstrapped standard errors accounting for individual-level clustering. 3. (I, II, IV, V, VI, VIII)/(III,VII): 250/100 bootstrap replications.
4. CRE: Correlated Random Effects. 5. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Repeating this analysis for the partisan subsample (Table 11), we nd that the
lagged and strong party support APEs estimates generally display lower statisti-
cal signicance and magnitude. Moreover, the strong party support e¤ect is now
more prominent among the male electorate. A closer inspection of the coe¢ cient
estimates from the joint (Tables 5 and 6) and partisan samples (Table 7) indi-
cates markedly greater initial support coe¢ cient magnitudes in the latter. This is
a major result as it indicates that partisan political party preferences are largely
predetermined and shaped by initial conditions. That is, by the positive association
between unobserved individual heterogeneity and initial party support.
The signicant Glasgow regional control coe¢ cients are generally more pro-
nounced in the partisan subsamples than in the joint sample estimates and stronger
among males, though statistical signicance varies (see Tables 5, 6 and 7). This
translates into notable APEs for Glaswegian male partisans that are around 7 per-
cent less likely to be SNP supporters than their North Eastern partisan counter-
parts. This probability varies between 4 percent and 6 percent for female partisans
(see Table 11).
Among the socioeconomic controls, two distinct gender-specic attributes con-
sistently a¤ect the SNP support probability in the joint sample estimates while
not generally having an impact in the partisan subsample estimations. First, be-
ing employed produces a female gender-specic e¤ect in favour of SNP support,
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though this vanishes in the partisan estimations. Employed (full/ part-time) and
self-employed females are generally over 3 percent more likely to be SNP supporters
according to the joint-sample estimated APEs (Table10), whereas employment has
no e¤ect on male support (Table 9). While not directly identiable, this outcome
could be due to a heightened interest in civic responsibility among employed fe-
males  e.g. Dhaval et al. (2016) nd that employment augmenting welfare reforms
in the US, increase female voting registration and participation.
TABLE 10.—  FEMALE CRE PROBIT AVERAGE PARTIAL EFFECTS ON THE PROBABILITY OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
UNBALANCED BALANCED
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Lagged SNP Support 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.033* 0.033* 0.027*** 0.024
(0.018) (0.018) (0.007) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.008) (0.017)
Strong Party Support 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.056***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013)
Employed/Self-employed 0.037** 0.037** 0.030** 0.036 0.030** 0.030** 0.020 0.031
(0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.024) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019)
University Qualifications -0.016 -0.016 -0.028* -0.013 -0.032 -0.031 -0.035 -0.03
(0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.033)
Glasgow -0.029 -0.031 -0.036* -0.042** -0.048* -0.054** -0.032 -0.062*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.035)
Comfortably Financially -0.006 -0.006 0.003 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 0.001 0.009
(0.022) (0.022) (0.016) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.018) (0.032)
Alright Financially 0.006 0.006 0.014 0.003 0.012 0.012 0.021 0.024
(0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.017) (0.031)
Just Getting by Financially 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.037
(0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.030)
Better Finances vs last year -0.018** -0.018** -0.020*** -0.018 -0.011 -0.011 -0.005 -0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014)
Worse Finances vs last year -0.010 -0.010 -0.007 -0.012 -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 -0.009
(0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.018)
Expect Better Finances 0.018* 0.018* 0.012 0.013 0.009 0.009 0.001 -0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014)
Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.013
(0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017)
Sample-Size 4,665 4,665 4,665 3,453 2,961 2,961 2,961 2,177
1. Average partial effects, for selected variables, on the probability of SNP support employing the CRE estimates in Table 6.
2. Bootstrapped standard errors accounting for individual-level clustering. 3. (I, II, IV, V, VI, VIII)/(III,VII): 250/100 bootstrap replications.
4. CRE: Correlated Random Effects. 5. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Second, holding a university degree has a remarkable negative e¤ect on male
support though this also vanishes in the partisan estimations. Specically, having
a university degree (as opposed to not having) reduces the male SNP support
probability by at least 5 percent in the unbalanced and 7 percent in the balanced
joint sample estimates (Table 9), underlining that we cannot separately identify
this e¤ect from its partial correlation with unobserved individual heterogeneity.
Among the female electorate this e¤ect is less pronounced and generally statistically
insignicant.
Recalling that other related studies such as Evans and Andersen (2006), John-
ston et al. (2005), Sanders and Brynin (1999) do not distinguish among the male
and female electorates, our estimates do highlight the importance of separating the
electorate by gender.
Finally, we analyse the impact of the economic perceptions variables. Compar-
ing the APEs across the distinct estimation samples gives rise to a clear pattern:
the estimated APEs in the joint samples (Tables 9, 10) do provide support for
economic voting theories, whereas, the respective APEs in the partisan estimates
(Table 11) do not. Hence, restricting estimation to the partisan fraction of the
electorate reduces the role of individual economic perceptions. This outcome con-
trasts with studies such as Evans and Pickup (2010) and Johnston et al. (2005),
where egocentric evaluations are largely irrelevant for the entire electorate. Conse-
quently, failing to study separately the partisan electorate can lead to misleading
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generalisations regarding the impact of egocentric economic evaluations.
TABLE 11.—  PARTISAN CRE PROBIT AVERAGE PARTIAL EFFECTS ON THE PROBABILITY OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
MALE FEMALE
Unbalanced (I-VI) I II III IV V VI
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Baseline Sample Dummy Weights
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Lagged SNP Support 0.039 0.039 0.046*** 0.034 0.034 0.033***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.007) (0.023) (0.023) (0.008)
Strong Party Support 0.020* 0.020* 0.022*** 0.007 0.007 0.008*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004)
Employed/Self-employed 0.000 -0.001 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.014
(0.018) (0.018) (0.010) (0.020) (0.020) (0.011)
University Qualifications -0.023 -0.022 -0.018 -0.015 -0.016 -0.028*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.019) (0.020) (0.015)
Glasgow -0.072** -0.074** -0.069** -0.040* -0.041 -0.059**
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.024) (0.025) (0.028)
Comfortably Financially -0.009 -0.009 -0.015 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001
(0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.024) (0.024) (0.012)
Alright Financially 0.018 0.018 0.010* 0.002 0.002 0.006
(0.015) (0.015) (0.006) (0.023) (0.023) (0.011)
Just Getting by Financially 0.005 0.005 0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008
(0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.020) (0.020) (0.011)
Better Finances vs last year -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.015 -0.015 -0.020***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007)
Worse Finances vs last year 0.016 0.016 0.017*** -0.007 -0.007 -0.004
(0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
Expect Better Finances 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.013 0.013 0.016***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005)
Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006)
Sample Size 2,384 2,384 2,384 2,687 2,687 2,687
1. Average partial effects, for selected variables, on the probability of SNP support employing the CRE estimates in Table 7.
2. Bootstrapped standard errors accounting for individual-level clustering. 3. (I,II,IV,V)/(III,VI): 250/100 bootstrap replications.
4. CRE: Correlated Random Effects. 5. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
More specically, the joint sample estimated APEs of economic perceptions (Ta-
bles 9 and 10) are in line with the predictions of post-election models of economic
voting, where the voters choice generally depends on retrospective economic eval-
uations. This is particularly true among the male electorate, where experiencing
worse personal nances compared to the year before augments the probability of
SNP support by over 2 percent across all of the unbalanced estimates and the bal-
anced weighted sample estimates (see Table 9), and where perceiving a nancial
improvement has the opposite e¤ect, being the statistical signicance in this case
limited to the unbalanced weighted and extension samples. Among the female elec-
torate (Table 10), perceiving a nancial improvement decreases the SNP support
probability, but negative retrospective evaluations have no signicant e¤ect. Hence,
the impact of retrospective evaluations is consistent with the presence of electoral
accountability.
With respect to prospective evaluations, the interpretation of the results in
relation with the predictions of economic voting theories is less straightforward.
Namely, pre-election models establish that optimistic expectations about changes
in economic conditions will favour the incumbent government party whereas pes-
simistic expectations will favour the opposition party. We can see that the cor-
responding APEs estimated coe¢ cients in the joint samples (not always statisti-
cally signicant) have the wrong sign according to these theoretical implications.
Nonetheless, a closer inspection of the male coe¢ cient estimates in Tables 5 and 7
reveals that the positive sign of better future nances in Table 9 is driven by the
partisan portion of the male electorate.
In particular, Table 5 reveals that the within-mean of uncertain/worse nancial
expectations constitutes the most important egocentric economic evaluation deter-
minant of male SNP support, as it enters all estimates with positive statistically
signicant coe¢ cients and the most sizeable magnitude. The male partisan esti-
mates, on the other hand, reveal that the within-mean of better nancial expecta-
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tions signicantly augments the SNP support probability with a sizeable coe¢ cient
(see Table 7). Hence, the positive impact of optimistic nancial expectations on the
male SNP support (Table 9) seems to be driven by the partisan portion of the male
electorate. Thus, male voters systematically reporting pessimistic expectations are
more likely to support the main opposition party, which is in line with economic
(pre-election) voting theories.
Regarding the female prospective economic evaluations, the APEs (Tables 10
and 11) and the corresponding estimated parameter coe¢ cients (Tables 6 and 7)
clearly indicate that expectations play a much less prominent role than in the
male estimations. Better expected nances also increase female support (though
statistical signicance varies) but, unlike in the male estimates, there is no evidence
that this e¤ect is driven by the partisan fraction of the electorate.
Concerning perceptions about the current nancial situation, these are generally
statistically insignicant (Tables 9, 10 and 11). However, the within-mean of alright
current nances constitutes the most important egocentric evaluation determinant
among partisan females, since it enters all estimates with a sizeable positive signif-
icant coe¢ cient (Table 7). Therefore, consistently reporting good current nances
among the partisan female electorate increases the probability of SNP support.
In summary, retrospective and prospective egocentric economic evaluations af-
fect party support, their inuence is consistent with the predictions of economic
voting theories, they are more pronounced among male than female voters and less
important among the partisan subsamples. Quite importantly, among the parti-
san fraction of the electorate, nancial security is positively associated with SNP
support.
4.3. Alternative Specication of the Dependent Variable: Incumbent
Labour Party Support
During the entire period under study, the SNP constituted the main opposi-
tion to the leading governing Labour Party. So there might be voters who switch
from Labour support to SNP support for retrospective reasons (e.g. attributing
the responsibility of a worsening nancial position to the incumbent party), event
captured by the denition of the binary SNP support indicator, but other swing
voters under the same circumstances might well decide to punish the incumbent
Labour with a switch in favour of other political parties. In the latter case our
dependent variable, SNP support, would record no change. In response to this, we
restructure the dependent variable so that it takes the value of one if an individual
indicates Labour Party support and zero otherwise.
To ensure that the estimates employing the initial dependent variable specica-
tion do not merely identify nationalist propensity determinants, but also indicate
economic voting behaviour, we reestimate all models in Tables 5-7 using instead
the binary indicator for Labour support. The estimates for Labour party support
(Appendix, Tables A7-A9) are e¤ectively the mirror image of the results obtained
using the SNP indicator specication: the economic factors augmenting opposition
(SNP) support reduce incumbent (Labour) support and vice-versa. Hence, our ini-
tial SNP support specication is indeed an adequate measure that ts the purpose
of identifying economic voting determinants generically outside the electoral cycle.
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4.4. Economic Voting and the Electoral Cycle
The timing of policy choices is a crucial question in probabilistic voting mod-
els conceiving economic policies as the outcome of a well dened non-cooperative
game. In pre-election models, parties/candidates formulate (enforceable) electoral
promises and then compete for o¢ ce (prospective evaluations). In post-election
models, all the action in policy making takes place once elected politicians are in
o¢ ce and, rather than selecting policies, voters select politicians generally on the
basis of their behaviour as incumbents (retrospective evaluations)- see for example,
Persson and Tabellini (2000).
As political preferences do display some variation over time (see Tables 1-4) it
is important to account for the dynamics triggered in di¤erent phases of the elec-
toral cycle. The transition probability matrices for the two electoral cycles reveal
non-negligible outows of past Labour voters to other parties, not only the SNP
but also Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, as well as towards not supporting
any party (see Appendix, Tables A18-A21). Given that the short duration of the
electoral cycles (four years) provides a small number of transitions and, as already
mentioned, the binary SNP support indicator will not capture all of these outows,
identication of swing voting determinants over the electoral cycles requires the
use of the Labour support indicator. Accordingly, we estimate incumbent Labour
Party support determinants during the periods preceding the two elections: 1999-
2002 and 2003-2006.
Following the UK 1997 general election, the Labour Party became the leading
governing party in the UK, and after the establishment of the new Scottish Parlia-
ment in 1999, the Labour Party was also established as the governing party in the
advent of the 1999 and 2003 Scottish Parliament elections. So the aforementioned
periods could be viewed as both pre- and post-election periods. This is partic-
ularly reected in the estimates for the rst electoral cycle of 1999-2002 (Tables
12-13) where, both prospective and retrospective economic evaluations appear as
signicant determinants of Labour Party support with the latter having a greater
impact.24
Over the 1999-2002 electoral cycle, both a repeated perceived deterioration of
the nancial situation with respect to the previous year (retrospective evaluation)
and a repeated expectation of uncertain/worse nances (prospective evaluation)
decrease the probability of support for the incumbent Labour Party. In the short
run, however, expected uncertain/worse nances increases the probability of Labour
Party support, perhaps reecting that the incumbent government party is seen as
a safer option. This economic voting behaviour holds across genders, though it is
more relevant in the male electorate (see Tables 12-13). These results are in line
with the male SNP/Labour Party support estimates obtained for the whole period
1999-2006 (see Table 5, and Table A7 in the Appendix).
Over the 2003-2006 electoral cycle, repeatedly reporting improved nances in-
creases the Labour support probability among female voters in all models, but
economic voting behaviour is absent in the male electorate (Tables 14-15). Hence,
regarding both electorate cycles retrospective economic evaluations appear to be a
major determinant of party support preferences and, except for the male estimates
over the 2003-2006 electoral cycle, the results do provide clear evidence that ego-
centric economic evaluations constitute an important factor of individual political
support during the two intervening electoral cycles.
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TABLE 12.— MALE DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF LABOUR PARTY SUPPORT, 1999-2002
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged Labour Support 0.408* 0.409* 0.249 0.400* 0.357 0.357 0.212 0.342
Labour Supporter (1999) 3.910*** 3.909*** 4.162*** 3.803*** 4.231*** 4.231*** 4.402*** 4.024***
Strong Party Support 0.079 0.079 0.050 -0.054 0.022 0.022 0.014 -0.177
m(Strong Party Support) -0.200 -0.198 -0.282 -0.131 -0.259 -0.259 -0.361 -0.092
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially -0.094 -0.095 -0.028 -0.099 0.030 0.030 0.089 0.026
    m(Comfortably Financially) 0.918 0.916 0.651 0.893 0.897 0.898 0.862 0.705
    Alright Financially -0.333 -0.333 -0.150 -0.237 -0.298 -0.298 -0.086 -0.204
    m(Alright Financially) 0.948 0.946 0.892 0.777 1.086 1.087 1.218 0.668
    Just Getting by Financially -0.214 -0.215 -0.133 -0.029 -0.179 -0.179 -0.103 0.034
    m(Getting by Financially) 0.665 0.665 0.728 0.652 0.840 0.840 1.238 0.729
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year 0.125 0.125 0.085 0.297* 0.162 0.161 0.120 0.313*
    m(Better Finances vs last year) -0.203 -0.205 -0.213 0.110 -0.502 -0.502 -0.419 0.023
    Worse Finances vs last year 0.016 0.016 -0.110 0.103 0.032 0.032 -0.072 0.069
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) -0.974** -0.976** -0.964* -0.869* -1.315*** -1.314*** -1.232** -1.210**
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances -0.202 -0.202 -0.161 -0.131 -0.232 -0.232 -0.219 -0.176
    m(Expect Better Finances) -0.215 -0.210 -0.217 -0.672 -0.190 -0.191 -0.256 -0.748
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances 0.383 0.382 0.574** 0.617** 0.424 0.424 0.580** 0.606**
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) -0.529 -0.532 -0.694 -0.965* -0.544 -0.543 -0.752 -0.986*
Original Sample Member 0.065 -0.012
Constant -2.005*** -2.014*** -2.059*** -1.947*** -2.158*** -2.157*** -2.431*** -1.745**
Log-Likelihood -694.517 -694.468 -725.378 -554.588 -612.701 -612.699 -642.983 -495.584
Sample Size 2,289 2,289 2,289 1,792 2,055 2,055 2,055 1,602
Wald (Global Significance) 249.663 250.541 190.460 208.955 207.552 208.426 157.791 184.071
Intra-Class Correlation 0.694*** 0.694*** 0.728*** 0.696*** 0.728*** 0.728*** 0.755*** 0.729***
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 5.
3. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 5 also apply here.
TABLE 13.— FEMALE DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF LABOUR PARTY SUPPORT, 1999-2002
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged Labour Support 0.514** 0.501** 0.788*** 0.353 0.584*** 0.574*** 0.883*** 0.394
Labour Supporter (1999) 4.121*** 4.159*** 3.668*** 4.488*** 4.058*** 4.089*** 3.588*** 4.535***
Strong Party Support 0.091 0.093 0.073 -0.098 0.065 0.066 0.013 -0.108
m(Strong Party Support) 0.269 0.271 0.020 0.392 0.255 0.261 -0.087 0.371
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially -0.039 -0.037 -0.056 0.038 -0.016 -0.012 0.031 0.080
    m(Comfortably Financially) 0.375 0.387 0.406 -0.152 0.070 0.074 -0.127 -0.585
    Alright Financially 0.034 0.035 -0.001 0.138 0.105 0.109 0.152 0.239
    m(Alright Financially) 0.307 0.342 0.366 -0.008 -0.297 -0.277 -0.453 -0.835
    Just Getting by Financially 0.061 0.061 -0.022 0.100 0.102 0.104 0.070 0.193
    m(Getting by Financially) 0.452 0.441 0.604 0.312 0.296 0.289 0.315 -0.014
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year 0.081 0.080 0.049 0.060 0.112 0.111 0.119 0.080
    m(Better Finances vs last year) -0.290 -0.312 -0.107 -0.379 -0.164 -0.174 -0.060 -0.282
    Worse Finances vs last year 0.244 0.245 0.286 0.212 0.210 0.210 0.249 0.153
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) -0.852* -0.838* -0.759 -0.681 -1.267** -1.251** -1.294*** -1.327**
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances -0.055 -0.052 -0.054 -0.127 -0.064 -0.063 -0.062 -0.161
    m(Expect Better Finances) 0.217 0.179 -0.034 0.224 -0.025 -0.065 -0.314 0.217
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances 0.347 0.346 0.494* 0.373 0.521** 0.521** 0.690*** 0.590**
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) -0.105 -0.114 -0.622 -0.181 -0.273 -0.283 -0.853* -0.082
Original Sample Member -0.375* -0.261
Constant -2.835*** -2.771*** -2.853*** -2.396*** -2.724*** -2.688*** -2.346*** -2.444***
Log-Likelihood -754.309 -752.575 -690.817 -557.423 -624.325 -623.523 -559.612 -452.374
Sample Size 2,583 2,583 2,583 1,924 2,259 2,259 2,259 1,668
Wald (Global Significance) 264.286 261.137 301.829 177.661 256.214 253.876 310.112 165.370
Intra-Class Correlation 0.729*** 0.730*** 0.703*** 0.751*** 0.693*** 0.694*** 0.652*** 0.725***
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 5.
3. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 5 also apply here.
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TABLE 14.— MALE DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF LABOUR PARTY SUPPORT, 2003-2006
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged Labour Support 0.682** 0.682** 0.568* 0.787** 0.679** 0.679** 0.553* 0.783**
Labour Supporter (2003) 3.507*** 3.511*** 3.770*** 2.996*** 3.535*** 3.536*** 3.788*** 3.006***
Strong Party Support -0.304 -0.303 -0.460* -0.553** -0.214 -0.214 -0.382 -0.456*
m(Strong Party Support) 0.387 0.394 0.588 0.522 0.211 0.216 0.404 0.363
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially -0.555 -0.557 -0.526 -0.468 -0.684 -0.685 -0.637 -0.626
    m(Comfortably Financially) 0.130 0.124 0.141 -0.262 0.657 0.654 0.875 0.296
    Alright Financially -0.420 -0.422 -0.340 -0.385 -0.515 -0.516 -0.426 -0.501
    m(Alright Financially) 0.429 0.443 0.562 -0.045 1.041 1.047 1.360 0.518
    Just Getting by Financially -0.324 -0.325 -0.212 -0.182 -0.348 -0.348 -0.237 -0.216
    m(Getting by Financially) -0.505 -0.505 -0.705 -1.037 -0.112 -0.111 -0.120 -0.662
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year 0.058 0.057 0.213 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.181 0.005
    m(Better Finances vs last year) 0.263 0.269 -0.040 0.350 0.444 0.448 0.144 0.495
    Worse Finances vs last year -0.174 -0.174 -0.040 -0.120 -0.191 -0.191 -0.056 -0.131
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) 0.282 0.316 0.135 0.388 0.584 0.603 0.523 0.690
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances 0.055 0.055 0.083 0.132 -0.021 -0.020 0.019 0.052
    m(Expect Better Finances) -0.348 -0.338 -0.129 -0.498 -0.359 -0.353 -0.148 -0.517
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances -0.357 -0.356 -0.280 -0.337 -0.401 -0.400 -0.314 -0.392
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) -0.505 -0.486 -0.757 -0.350 -0.527 -0.514 -0.803 -0.375
Original Sample Member -0.203 -0.112
Constant -1.245 -1.241 -1.198 -0.552 -1.700** -1.702** -1.827** -0.967
Log-Likelihood -456.453 -456.102 -470.706 -383.229 -426.64 -426.541 -441.64 -356.215
Sample Size 1,676 1,676 1,676 1,330 1,572 1,572 1,572 1,242
Wald (Global Significance) 216.376 217.576 188.813 198.561 203.167 205.467 174.274 187.235
Intra-Class Correlation 0.629*** 0.628*** 0.662*** 0.580*** 0.632*** 0.631*** 0.663*** 0.584***
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 5.
3. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 5 also apply here.
TABLE 15.— FEMALE DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF LABOUR PARTY SUPPORT, 2003-2006
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged Labour Support 0.337 0.341 0.472 0.369 0.415 0.419 0.545 0.427
Labour Supporter (2003) 5.595*** 5.624*** 5.254*** 5.459*** 5.898*** 5.958*** 5.513*** 5.895***
Strong Party Support -0.335 -0.335 -0.072 -0.233 -0.372 -0.374 -0.098 -0.264
m(Strong Party Support) 0.701 0.729 0.567 0.730 0.313 0.316 0.189 0.326
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially 0.057 0.062 -0.317 0.010 -0.125 -0.121 -0.496 -0.153
    m(Comfortably Financially) -0.620 -0.697 -0.558 -0.783 -0.394 -0.545 -0.154 -1.137
    Alright Financially 0.047 0.053 -0.283 -0.060 -0.179 -0.174 -0.459 -0.292
    m(Alright Financially) 0.793 0.748 0.666 0.527 1.039 0.923 0.984 0.317
    Just Getting by Financially 0.403 0.413 0.210 0.530 0.122 0.134 -0.049 0.321
    m(Getting by Financially) -0.736 -0.820 -0.853 -1.065 -0.633 -0.795 -0.536 -1.786
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year -0.344 -0.347 -0.239 -0.301 -0.313 -0.316 -0.337 -0.370
    m(Better Finances vs last year) 1.201** 1.192** 1.125* 1.433** 1.302* 1.296* 1.525** 1.835**
    Worse Finances vs last year 0.080 0.083 -0.009 0.213 -0.038 -0.036 -0.213 0.181
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) -0.469 -0.405 -0.563 -0.109 0.184 0.266 0.247 0.417
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances 0.155 0.156 0.245 0.006 0.368 0.371 0.522** 0.220
    m(Expect Better Finances) -0.065 -0.115 0.008 0.242 0.010 -0.068 -0.038 0.482
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances -0.277 -0.280 -0.308 -0.247 -0.221 -0.221 -0.319 -0.116
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) -0.233 -0.257 -0.282 -1.020 0.047 0.034 -0.014 -0.520
Original Sample Member -0.395 -0.523
Constant -5.469*** -5.383*** -4.214*** -5.794*** -5.906*** -5.741*** -4.842*** -5.946***
Log-Likelihood -462.371 -461.693 -422.333 -355.786 -393.156 -392.222 -360.807 -299.082
Sample Size 1,869 1,869 1,869 1,400 1,683 1,683 1,683 1,254
Wald (Global Significance) 132.535 133.915 152.272 105.335 125.030 125.592 146.687 99.218
Intra-Class Correlation 0.831*** 0.830*** 0.806*** 0.832*** 0.838*** 0.837*** 0.820*** 0.835***
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 5.
3. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 5 also apply here.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We explore the dynamics of SNP support using longitudinal data from the BHPS
dataset during the period 1999-2006. Exploiting the Scottish extension sample, we
investigate the relative importance of political sentiments and egocentric economic
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evaluations by disentangling the e¤ects of state dependence and unobserved het-
erogeneity.
We study the evolution of gender-specic political party preferences both among
the entire electorate and among the partisan subsample. We employ a dynamic
specication, consider both compact unbalanced and balanced panel sample selec-
tion mechanisms, and account for initial conditions and unequal sample selection
probabilities.
Our main results can be summarised as follows. With respect to political senti-
ments, even after controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity, political party sup-
port preferences are quite persistent, being persistence generally stronger among
the male electorate. The role of state dependence is, however, substantially re-
duced upon restricting estimations to the partisan subsample. The initial value of
political party support is the most important determinant of party support, having
markedly greater coe¢ cient magnitudes compared to those of the lagged support
variable. This indicates a considerable correlation between the unobserved individ-
ual heterogeneity and the initial condition, which is particularly accentuated among
the partisan electorate.
Regarding egocentric economic evaluations, their impact on political party sup-
port di¤ers by gender and depends on the voters political proximity, exerting a
stronger inuence on the male SNP support. Considering the entire electorate
samples, retrospective and prospective egocentric economic evaluations do a¤ect
political party support in accordance with the egocentric economic voting hypothe-
sis: the electors hold the incumbent government party accountable for their personal
nancial situation. Among the partisan electorate, however, the role of egocentric
economic evaluations is reduced. In fact, nancial stability and optimism increase
partisan support for the main opposition party, which is e¤ectively at odds with
economic voting theoretical predictions.
To ensure that our estimates are not merely capturing nationalist propensity
determinants, and to account for outows from the incumbent Labour to parties
other than the SNP, we additionally estimate models of Labour party support.
Employing the Labour support indicator shows that the economic evaluations that
increase the opposition (SNP) support reduce incumbent (Labour) support and
vice-versa.
Our study highlights the importance of employing longitudinal data over a suf-
ciently long time period for the analysis of the economic vote hypothesis. Indeed,
the most prominent party support determinant for the entire male electorate, other
than initial support, is consistently expecting uncertain/worse nances. Therefore,
long-term di¤erences in egocentric evaluations are more likely to inuence political
support as opposed to short-term evaluations, which is in line with the conclu-
sion of Pickup and Evans (2013). Further, concerning the partisan electorate, sys-
tematically reporting alright current nances and better expected nances are the
principal egocentric evaluation determinants of nationalist party support among
females and males, respectively. Therefore, failure to perform separate estimations
for the partisan electorate can lead to erroneous generalisations about the impact
of egocentric economic evaluations.
Finally, we test the validity of the economic voting hypothesis accounting for the
dynamics triggered in di¤erent phases of the electoral cycle. Estimating incumbent
(Labour) support models during the two intervening electoral cycles (1999-2002
and 2003-2006) we nd clear evidence that retrospective economic evaluations do
constitute an important determinant of incumbent party support.
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Our results are in agreement with studies providing supporting evidence for
economic voting theories (e.g. Sanders and Brynin, 1999, Nadeau et al., 2012) and
contrasts with the works of Evans and Pickup (2010) and Johnston et al. (2005)
concluding that egocentric evaluations are largely irrelevant for the entire electorate.
The obvious future research direction is to verify whether our general conclusions
about the economic voting hypothesis and partisanship can be validated among
distinct country electorates.
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Notes
1 In another international comparative study Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) review a volumi-
nous body of research concluding that sociotropic and egocentric economic evaluations do inuence
government support. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaiers (2013) review of micro-studies concludes that
retrospective evaluations have a greater impact than prospective ones.
2Voting studies using the BHPS, other than Johnston et al. (2005), are not abundant and do
not focus on the Scotland. Oswald and Powdthavee (2010) show that having daughters makes
people more likely to vote for left-wing parties. Powdthavee and Oswald (2014) nd that lottery
winners, particularly males, tend to switch to more right-wing parties. Liberini et al. (2017),
controlling for nancial and economic circumstances, nd that individuals that are more satised
with life tend to vote for the governing party.
3University of Essex. Institute for Social and Economic Research. (2010). British House-
hold Panel Survey: Waves 1-18, 1991-2009. [data collection]. 7th Ed. UK Data Service. SN:
5151, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-5151-1; Conditional Access, Local Authority District
Codes. [data collection]. 3rd Ed. UK Data Service. SN: 6028, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-
SN-6028-1.
4Regional controls are formed according to the o¢ cial Scottish Parliament electoral regions and
constituencies as follows. Glasgow City, Lothians (East and Midlothian, Borders, Edinburgh City,
West Lothians, Lothian n.o.s), Higlands and Islands (NW Highlands, Western Isles, S & E High-
lands, Orkney, Shetlands, Highlands & Islands n.o.s), Central Scotland (Farlik, Cumbernauld &
Kilsyth, Monklands, East Kilbride, Hamilton, Motherwell), West Scotland (Argyll & Bute, Dum-
barton, Inverclyde, Bearsden, Clydebank, Strathkelvin, Cunninghame, Renfrew), South Scotland
(Annadale, Nithsdale, Stewarty, Wigtown: Dumfries and Galloway, Clydesdale, Cumnock Doon,
Kyle Carric, Eastwood, Kilmarnock & Loudoun, Dumfries and Galloway n.o.s), Mid Scotland
and Fife (Clackmannan, Stirling, Dunfermline, Kirkcaldy, NE Fife, Angus, Perth & Kinross, Fife
n.o.s.), North East Scotland (Aberdeen City, Bannfshire & Buchan, Moray, Gordon, Kincardine
& Deeside, Dundee City).
5Sociotropic evaluations could be proxied, at least to certain extent, by regional gross domestic
product growth and other macroeconomic indicators. However, we do not have data on such
variables for the breakdown of the Local Authority controls included during the entire period
analysed. Nevertheless, including regional macroeconomic variables would only add constants
(displaying some annual variation) per regional grouping of individuals. This is already captured
by the inclusion of regional controls and time period dummies.
6Equivalent income is computed as annual household income divided by the square root of
household members to account for di¤erences in householdssize and composition.
7Liberini et al., (2017) use equivalent income and retrospective evaluations. Sanders and Brynin
(1999) include changes in egocentric evaluations and net personal annual income, whereas, Oswald
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and Powdthavee (2010) only use annual deated household income per capita. The former get
near zero coe¢ cients on income.
8Further, the model assumes strict exogeneity of the xit conditional on "i, as only xit appears
on the RHS of eq.(2) ; while xi=(xi1; :::;xiT ) enters in the conditioning set of the LHS. For
unbalanced panels, we have to assume that the sample selection process is strictly exogenous with
respect to the idiosyncratic shocks to yit and that unbalancedness is independent of "i. Ignoring
the unbalancedness can produce inconsistent parameter estimates unless the sample selection
process is independent of initial condition shocks and, additionally, the process is either in a
steady state or the initial observations stem from the same exogenous distribution or selection
rule 8 i and ti (see Albarran et al., 2015, p.7).
9Fixed e¤ects (FE) estimation leaves the conditional distribution of "i unrestricted but given
xed-T asymptotics we cannot obtain consistent MLE estimates of  due to the presence of "i in
eq.(2), see Heckman (1981b). Carro (2007) o¤ers a modied FE MLE for dynamic discrete choice
though e¤ective bias reduction requires T > 8. Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000) propose a xed-
T consistent (though not
p
N -consistent) estimator for dynamic discrete choice with continuous
exogenous covariates requiring the logistic and further assumptions.
10Swing voters can be either ideologically neutral or not (dened as non-partisans/partisans in
our analysis, respectively). Swing voting in this study reects a change in voting intentions (not
actual voting outcomes) among two consecutive time periods. This is somewhat distinct to the
denition used in the literature whereby swinging refers to voting a di¤erent party from that of
the previous electoral cycle
11Arulampalam and Stewart (2009) show that none of the Heckman (1981b) and Wooldridge
(2005) estimators dominates the other and, once the Mundlak (1978)-Chamberlain (1984) corre-
lated random e¤ects (CRE) framework is employed the estimators give similar results.
12Failure to account for initial conditions and ignoring the presence of unobserved heterogeneity
(#i) substantially inates the impact of yit 1(see Appendix, Tables A1-A3). Controlling for initial
conditions but not accounting for the presence of #i still provides inconsistent parameter estimates
and inates the coe¢ cients on yit 1(see Appendix, Tables A4-A6).
13This version of estimator performs similarly, in terms of relative bias and RMSE, to the
specication of the conditional distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in Wooldridge (2005)
except for the case of an AR(1) process assumed for xit with short panels (see Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal, 2013).
14Albarran et al. (2015) suggest simultaneous estimation of all available contiguous sequences,
that is sub-panels of observations with T > 3. As only left-side unbalancedness is present in our
analysis, i.e., di¤erent starting periods and a common ending period in 2006 (T = 8), this gives
6 distinct sub-panels. Nevertheless, 1999 is the sample initiation period for approximately 90:4
percent of individuals and distinct initiation period sub-panels do not contain su¢ cient obser-
vations, particularly as the panel lengthens. The same holds regarding the partisan subsamples
where 1999 is the sample initiation period of approximately 88:5 percent individuals. Thus, we
cannot apply this estimation strategy.
15We carry out sample attrition tests by adding functions of individual responses in our un-
balanced estimations (see Verbeek and Nijman, 1992, p.688). The attrition-detection controls
generally have positive statistically signicant coe¢ cients in the male samples and negative and
insignicant in the female samples (the corresponding estimates are available upon request).
16The Scottish extension sample was aimed towards increasing the small sample size of around
400-500 households in the initial BHPS sample to approximately 1,500 respondent households (see
Taylor et al., Table 25, p.156, 2010).
17Longitudinal weights at any wave of the BHPS are a product of the sequence of attrition
weights accounting for losses between each contiguous pair of waves up to that point, and the
initial period respondent weight (see Taylor et al., p.190, 2010). We employ the wLRWTSW2
respondent weight from the latest wave, w, in the longitudinal sequence as suggested by the data
depositors when performing longitudinal analyses of individual respondents from the original and
extension samples at the Scottish level (see Taylor et al., Table 25, p.197, 2010).
18 In the unweighted sample there are around 2.5 as many observations in Scotland than expected
from the population distribution. Weighting in the BHPS employs a weighting class method where
individuals are classied into respondents/non-respondents via variables that are informative of
non-response such as age, sex, employment status and education. Initial sample members present
in 1999 were eligible for a positive weight (as opposed to zero), regardless of previous waves
response status (see Taylor et al., pp.192-5, 2010).
19Estimation with sampling weights is undertaken using the "gllamm" command in Stata as-
signing the respective longitudinal sampling weight (from the latest wave in the sequence) at the
individual level (level 2) while the panel wave (level 1) weight is set to unity.
26
20Robust standard errors can be used since sampling weights do not apply to units at a lower
level than the highest level (within the context of a multilevel model)- see Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal (2006, pp.811-2).
21 Including the objective annual equivalent household income along with the three subjective
economic evaluations is another option, noting that annual household income and current nances
are collinear to a certain extent. The respective estimations (available by the authors upon request)
do not change our conclusions regarding the impact of individual retrospective and prospective
evaluations.
22The presence of #i in equation (3) renders successive disturbances temporally correlated. The
intra-class correlation coe¢ cient =corr(it; is)=
2#
2
#
+2
; t; s=2; :::; T ; t 6= s (normalising 2=1)
is provided at the bottom of all CRE estimates and it is always statistically signicant rendering
pooled probit estimation inappropriate. In the pooled models, 2 is normalised to 1 and the
estimated s are population-averaged parameters by default.
23Bootstrap replications for CRE models with sampling weights are computationally very time-
consuming. In estimating standard errors 50200 bootstrap replications are generally su¢ cient
(Mooney and Duval, 1993, p.11). Using 100 instead of 250 bootstrap replications in all CRE
models without samlping weights had either minimal or no impact on the statistical signicance
of the APEs.
24We do not report the estimates for the partisan samples since t=4 in the two electoral cy-
cles analysed is too short. This translates into an insu¢ ciently large number of transitions so
as to facilitate identication of swing voting behaviour among a fraction of the electorate that
has particularly persistent voting preferences (the corresponding transition probabilities and the
estimations are available upon request).
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Appendix A. Supporting Information
6. POOLED PROBIT ESTIMATIONS OF SNP SUPPORT (1999-2006)
EXCLUDING INITIAL CONDITIONS
TABLE A1.— MALE (Excluding Initial Conditions) DYNAMIC POOLED PROBIT MODELS OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged SNP Support 2.507*** 2.501*** 2.523*** 2.526*** 2.550*** 2.545*** 2.530*** 2.533***
Strong Party Support 0.090 0.090 0.081 0.125 0.127 0.125 0.119 0.166
m(Strong Party Support) 0.291** 0.294** 0.297** 0.283** 0.294* 0.302** 0.245 0.287*
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially 0.052 0.055 -0.004 0.123 0.305 0.308 0.205 0.275
    m(Comfortably Financially) -0.255 -0.261 -0.103 -0.056 -0.715** -0.720** -0.512 -0.378
    Alright Financially 0.021 0.024 -0.068 0.095 0.282 0.285 0.134 0.275
    m(Alright Financially) -0.158 -0.161 -0.072 0.049 -0.601** -0.602* -0.420 -0.261
    Just Getting by Financially -0.027 -0.022 -0.118 0.018 0.003 0.007 -0.103 -0.030
    m(Getting by Financially) 0.031 0.017 0.214 0.270 -0.157 -0.164 0.072 0.183
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year -0.076 -0.076 -0.074 -0.147 0.041 0.041 0.015 -0.021
    m(Better Finances vs last year) -0.028 -0.019 0.001 -0.108 -0.154 -0.148 -0.102 -0.335
    Worse Finances vs last year 0.154 0.156 0.118 0.208* 0.121 0.120 0.089 0.135
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) -0.334* -0.319* -0.344 -0.355* -0.347 -0.328 -0.221 -0.418
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances 0.111 0.110 0.106 0.083 0.182** 0.181** 0.159* 0.168*
    m(Expect Better Finances) 0.016 0.005 0.064 0.166 -0.007 -0.020 0.081 0.305
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances -0.240* -0.239* -0.211 -0.396*** -0.186 -0.184 -0.175 -0.272
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) 0.668*** 0.672*** 0.835*** 0.900*** 0.604** 0.602* 0.698** 0.922***
Original Sample Member -0.110 -0.108
Constant -1.666*** -1.643*** -1.804*** -2.045*** -1.585*** -1.570*** -1.584*** -2.125***
Log-Likelihood -1091.148 -1090.092 -1106.476 -859.373 -735.544 -734.886 -761.289 -586.267
Sample Size 4,257 4,257 4,257 3,334 2,954 2,954 2,954 2,324
Wald (Global Significance) 1035.458 1030.387 912.761 823.349 745.367 743.205 679.860 586.324
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 5 (in the main article).
3. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 5 (in the main article) also apply here.
TABLE A2.— FEMALE (Excluding Initial Conditions) DYNAMIC POOLED PROBIT MODELS OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged SNP Support 2.476*** 2.475*** 2.492*** 2.446*** 2.478*** 2.473*** 2.529*** 2.385***
Strong Party Support 0.221*** 0.223*** 0.219** 0.242*** 0.241** 0.245** 0.253** 0.311***
m(Strong Party Support) -0.078 -0.078 -0.024 -0.097 -0.010 -0.007 0.046 -0.019
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially 0.053 0.054 0.060 0.041 0.142 0.145 0.126 0.225
    m(Comfortably Financially) -0.051 -0.049 -0.120 0.079 -0.247 -0.304 -0.451 -0.265
    Alright Financially 0.148 0.151 0.174 0.122 0.269 0.274 0.283 0.341
    m(Alright Financially) -0.117 -0.110 -0.194 0.038 -0.263 -0.283 -0.459 -0.227
    Just Getting by Financially 0.112 0.114 0.141 0.110 0.305* 0.307* 0.318* 0.420*
    m(Getting by Financially) -0.193 -0.191 -0.289 -0.168 -0.592* -0.627** -0.836** -0.705*
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year -0.189** -0.191** -0.213** -0.173* -0.197* -0.197* -0.177 -0.163
    m(Better Finances vs last year) 0.024 0.020 0.168 -0.140 -0.090 -0.078 0.061 -0.333
    Worse Finances vs last year -0.142 -0.143 -0.120 -0.121 -0.162 -0.161 -0.131 -0.139
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) 0.496*** 0.502*** 0.596*** 0.559*** 0.518* 0.529** 0.629** 0.566*
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances 0.244** 0.246** 0.167 0.232** 0.258** 0.263** 0.204 0.199
    m(Expect Better Finances) 0.014 -0.004 -0.007 0.203 0.140 0.094 0.033 0.271
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances 0.087 0.087 0.110 0.051 0.084 0.083 0.108 0.054
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) -0.151 -0.147 -0.314 -0.133 0.024 0.073 -0.283 -0.156
Original Sample Member -0.133** -0.227**
Constant -1.691*** -1.652*** -1.815*** -2.008*** -1.841*** -1.766*** -1.857*** -1.906***
Log-Likelihood -1124.651 -1122.862 -1015.952 -863.738 -695.756 -692.808 -600.968 -556.568
Sample Size 4,665 4,665 4,665 3,453 2,961 2,961 2,961 2,177
Wald (Global Significance) 1088.389 1102.100 949.443 831.298 669.533 703.240 637.527 539.056
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 5 (in the main article).
3. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 5 (in the main article) also apply here.
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TABLE A3.— PARTISAN (Excluding Initial Conditions) DYNAMIC POOLED  PROBIT MODELS OF SNP PARTY SUPPORT, 1999-2006
Unbalanced (I-VI) I II III IV V VI
Baseline (Male) Sample Dummy (Male) Weights (Male) Baseline (Female) Sample Dummy (Female) Weights (Female)
Lagged SNP Support 3.458*** 3.448*** 3.567*** 3.185*** 3.186*** 3.272***
Strong Party Support 0.451*** 0.446*** 0.477*** 0.069 0.070 0.133
m(Strong Party Support) -0.066 -0.069 -0.098 0.028 0.023 0.018
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially -0.115 -0.103 -0.325 0.018 0.018 0.116
    m(Comfortably Financially) 0.066 0.056 0.297 0.061 0.066 0.037
    Alright Financially 0.184 0.201 0.016 0.031 0.032 0.163
    m(Alright Financially) -0.038 -0.041 0.133 0.212 0.223 0.109
    Just Getting by Financially -0.053 -0.035 -0.144 -0.048 -0.046 -0.020
    m(Getting by Financially) 0.263 0.246 0.380 -0.059 -0.060 -0.212
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year 0.067 0.063 -0.029 -0.209 -0.211 -0.312*
    m(Better Finances vs last year) -0.396 -0.402 -0.312 0.172 0.169 0.337
    Worse Finances vs last year 0.179 0.183 0.137 -0.252* -0.252* -0.239
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) -0.251 -0.247 -0.275 0.549** 0.546** 0.602**
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances -0.042 -0.040 0.002 0.202 0.203 0.269
    m(Expect Better Finances) 0.456* 0.462* 0.420* 0.227 0.215 0.137
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances -0.039 -0.039 0.065 0.241 0.241 0.214
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) 0.298 0.328 0.464 -0.228 -0.211 -0.059
Original Sample Member -0.198** -0.057
Constant -2.556*** -2.504*** -2.744*** -2.217*** -2.214*** -2.580***
Log-Likelihood -337.456 -336.356 -311.823 -390.325 -390.21 -331.989
Sample Size 2,384 2,384 2,384 2,687 2,687 2,687
Wald (Global Significance) 816.250 828.931 822.943 654.960 656.084 647.361
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 7 (in the main article).
3. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 7 (in the main article) also apply here.
7. POOLED PROBIT ESTIMATIONS OF SNP SUPPORT (1999-2006) WITH
INITIAL CONDITIONS
TABLE A4.— MALE DYNAMIC POOLED PROBIT MODELS OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged SNP Support 1.712*** 1.711*** 1.758*** 1.770*** 1.826*** 1.826*** 1.803*** 1.836***
SNP Supporter (1999) 1.218*** 1.215*** 1.189*** 1.157*** 1.178*** 1.183*** 1.203*** 1.144***
Strong Party Support 0.136 0.136 0.147 0.173 0.182 0.183 0.192 0.225*
m(Strong Party Support) 0.312** 0.313** 0.275* 0.284* 0.295* 0.291* 0.216 0.267
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially 0.039 0.040 -0.023 0.072 0.282 0.281 0.186 0.202
    m(Comfortably Financially) -0.061 -0.063 -0.026 0.365 -0.619 -0.617 -0.521 0.044
    Alright Financially 0.025 0.026 -0.085 0.072 0.271 0.270 0.108 0.232
    m(Alright Financially) 0.010 0.008 0.003 0.399 -0.525 -0.524 -0.420 0.057
    Just Getting by Financially -0.017 -0.015 -0.124 0.011 -0.019 -0.021 -0.136 -0.072
    m(Getting by Financially) 0.220 0.215 0.315 0.604* 0.001 0.004 0.175 0.552
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year -0.089 -0.089 -0.088 -0.168 0.025 0.025 -0.005 -0.057
    m(Better Finances vs last year) -0.103 -0.098 -0.105 -0.186 -0.164 -0.166 -0.207 -0.450
    Worse Finances vs last year 0.184* 0.184* 0.160 0.230** 0.175 0.176 0.159 0.181
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) -0.386* -0.380 -0.436* -0.324 -0.490 -0.497 -0.448 -0.501
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances 0.120 0.119 0.124 0.113 0.187** 0.187** 0.181* 0.201**
    m(Expect Better Finances) 0.237 0.233 0.295 0.390* 0.210 0.214 0.318 0.590**
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances -0.216* -0.216* -0.205 -0.340** -0.170 -0.170 -0.182 -0.223
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) 0.830*** 0.831*** 0.981*** 1.062*** 0.749** 0.750** 0.887** 1.145***
Original Sample Member -0.040 0.036
Constant -2.227*** -2.218*** -2.234*** -2.741*** -1.981*** -1.986*** -1.787*** -2.776***
Log-Likelihood -981.419 -981.295 -1001.793 -781.025 -663.62 -663.558 -685.513 -532.373
Sample Size 4,257 4,257 4,257 3,334 2,954 2,954 2,954 2,324
Wald (Global Significance) 1345.038 1345.731 1239.468 1082.805 922.994 938.621 897.922 764.397
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 5 (in the main article).
3. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 5 (in the main article) also apply here.
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TABLE A5.— FEMALE DYNAMIC POOLED PROBIT MODELS OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged SNP Support 1.570*** 1.569*** 1.561*** 1.570*** 1.588*** 1.577*** 1.622*** 1.557***
SNP Supporter (1999) 1.378*** 1.377*** 1.390*** 1.388*** 1.459*** 1.469*** 1.469*** 1.446***
Strong Party Support 0.255*** 0.256*** 0.245*** 0.280*** 0.310*** 0.315*** 0.322*** 0.395***
m(Strong Party Support) -0.156 -0.155 -0.032 -0.177 -0.119 -0.115 0.019 -0.186
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially -0.056 -0.057 -0.011 -0.072 -0.016 -0.020 0.010 0.106
    m(Comfortably Financially) 0.410 0.415 0.274 0.708** 0.349 0.283 -0.039 0.520
    Alright Financially 0.063 0.063 0.117 0.039 0.165 0.162 0.221 0.258
    m(Alright Financially) 0.243 0.251 0.137 0.484 0.209 0.183 -0.162 0.287
    Just Getting by Financially 0.048 0.048 0.085 0.058 0.246 0.243 0.273 0.374
    m(Getting by Financially) 0.065 0.071 -0.067 0.170 -0.319 -0.368 -0.678* -0.283
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year -0.163* -0.165* -0.187** -0.161 -0.137 -0.135 -0.088 -0.135
    m(Better Finances vs last year) -0.086 -0.086 0.124 -0.288 -0.261 -0.238 -0.036 -0.446
    Worse Finances vs last year -0.125 -0.125 -0.096 -0.123 -0.151 -0.150 -0.115 -0.154
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) 0.406* 0.414* 0.520** 0.487** 0.347 0.369 0.396 0.395
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances 0.223** 0.225** 0.151 0.187* 0.203* 0.207* 0.144 0.133
    m(Expect Better Finances) 0.109 0.091 -0.020 0.395* 0.317 0.262 0.004 0.493
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances 0.109 0.109 0.129 0.073 0.106 0.106 0.115 0.080
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) -0.237 -0.234 -0.413 -0.169 -0.085 -0.025 -0.507 -0.235
Original Sample Member -0.130 -0.277**
Constant -2.259*** -2.219*** -2.455*** -2.639*** -2.549*** -2.457*** -2.678*** -2.626***
Log-Likelihood -994.684 -993.233 -898.274 -762.279 -603.815 -600.306 -521.614 -484.501
Sample Size 4,665 4,665 4,665 3,453 2,961 2,961 2,961 2,177
Wald (Global Significance) 1461.713 1474.922 1396.599 1115.647 890.077 927.177 902.027 774.565
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 5 (in the main article).
3. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 5 (in the main article) also apply here.
TABLE A6.— PARTISAN DYNAMIC POOLED PROBIT MODELS OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
Unbalanced (I-VI) I II III IV V VI
Baseline (Male) Sample Dummy (Male) Weights (Male) Baseline (Female) Sample Dummy (Female) Weights (Female)
Lagged SNP Support 2.220*** 2.220*** 2.360*** 2.071*** 2.069*** 2.019***
SNP Supporter (1999) 1.752*** 1.743*** 1.716*** 1.616*** 1.619*** 1.789***
Strong Party Support 0.435** 0.433** 0.483** 0.083 0.083 0.138
m(Strong Party Support) -0.027 -0.030 -0.093 -0.158 -0.162 -0.133
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially -0.223 -0.219 -0.413 -0.130 -0.132 -0.036
    m(Comfortably Financially) 0.340 0.330 0.594 0.434 0.441 0.484
    Alright Financially 0.139 0.145 -0.030 -0.066 -0.066 0.065
    m(Alright Financially) 0.378 0.368 0.560 0.619 0.634 0.620*
    Just Getting by Financially -0.068 -0.062 -0.168 -0.101 -0.099 -0.089
    m(Getting by Financially) 0.741 0.723 0.962* 0.115 0.112 -0.026
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year 0.050 0.047 -0.044 -0.197 -0.199 -0.317*
    m(Better Finances vs last year) -0.545 -0.541 -0.421 0.261 0.261 0.404
    Worse Finances vs last year 0.179 0.181 0.155 -0.202 -0.201 -0.177
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) -0.349 -0.343 -0.357 0.487 0.480 0.465
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances -0.002 -0.002 0.031 0.232 0.234 0.318*
    m(Expect Better Finances) 0.684** 0.686** 0.585* 0.241 0.219 0.129
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances -0.047 -0.048 0.024 0.213 0.212 0.187
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) 0.335 0.341 0.533 -0.448 -0.425 -0.213
Original Sample Member -0.086 -0.089
Constant -3.285*** -3.248*** -3.569*** -2.675*** -2.666*** -3.074***
Log-Likelihood -288.682 -288.506 -270.195 -337.157 -336.930 -281.577
Sample Size 2,384 2,384 2,384 2,687 2,687 2,687
Wald (Global Significance) 1093.819 1102.683 1206.880 858.780 867.138 817.637
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 7 (in the main article).
3. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 7 (in the main article) also apply here.
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8. ESTIMATIONS OF LABOUR PARTY SUPPORT DURING 1999-2006
TABLE A7.— MALE DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF LABOUR PARTY SUPPORT, 1999-2006
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged Labour Support 0.644*** 0.643*** 0.594*** 0.649*** 0.671*** 0.671*** 0.638*** 0.697***
Labour Supporter (1999) 3.342*** 3.347*** 3.282*** 3.146*** 3.419*** 3.417*** 3.260*** 3.123***
Strong Party Support -0.025 -0.024 -0.067 -0.132 -0.066 -0.066 -0.108 -0.171
m(Strong Party Support) 0.074 0.077 0.036 0.083 -0.017 -0.013 -0.025 -0.010
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially -0.367 -0.367 -0.266 -0.371 -0.476 -0.477 -0.340 -0.387
    m(Comfortably Financially) 1.190** 1.186** 0.814 1.020* 2.178*** 2.179*** 2.010** 1.549*
    Alright Financially -0.347* -0.348* -0.154 -0.302 -0.325 -0.325 -0.080 -0.245
    m(Alright Financially) 1.145** 1.134** 1.002* 0.944* 1.813** 1.817** 1.683** 0.890
    Just Getting by Financially -0.218 -0.219 -0.101 -0.072 -0.091 -0.090 0.020 0.112
    m(Getting by Financially) 0.656 0.662 0.507 0.432 1.149 1.150 1.065 0.363
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year 0.194 0.194 0.168 0.336*** 0.080 0.079 0.049 0.203
    m(Better Finances vs last year) -0.166 -0.168 -0.206 -0.148 -0.993* -1.000* -1.007 -0.681
    Worse Finances vs last year -0.136 -0.135 -0.216 -0.068 -0.270* -0.270* -0.293* -0.229
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) -0.125 -0.147 -0.003 -0.118 0.219 0.228 0.228 0.364
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances -0.155 -0.155 -0.095 -0.164 -0.200 -0.200 -0.200 -0.285**
    m(Expect Better Finances) -0.128 -0.119 -0.156 -0.384 0.097 0.097 0.158 -0.453
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances 0.193 0.192 0.286* 0.253 0.371** 0.371** 0.359** 0.419**
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) -0.478 -0.490 -0.725 -0.625 -0.205 -0.205 -0.356 -0.632
Original Sample Member 0.192 -0.065
Constant -2.318*** -2.346*** -2.099*** -1.770*** -3.439*** -3.430*** -3.112*** -1.709*
Log-Likelihood -1179.755 -1179.146 -1242.998 -964.089 -757.176 -757.137 -811.931 -624.267
Sample Size 4,257 4,257 4,257 3,334 2,954 2,954 2,954 2,324
Wald (Global Significance) 551.060 551.639 478.185 453.753 395.982 396.397 354.101 330.393
Intra-Class Correlation 0.650*** 0.650*** 0.652*** 0.637*** 0.645*** 0.645*** 0.644*** 0.620***
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 5 (in the main article).
3. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 5 (in the main article) also apply here.
TABLE A8.— FEMALE DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF LABOUR PARTY SUPPORT, 1999-2006
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged Labour Support 0.630*** 0.628*** 0.604*** 0.532*** 0.557*** 0.557*** 0.435*** 0.431***
Labour Supporter (1999) 3.694*** 3.703*** 3.786*** 3.711*** 4.363*** 4.359*** 4.588*** 4.349***
Strong Party Support -0.091 -0.091 -0.021 -0.235* -0.316* -0.316* -0.214 -0.481***
m(Strong Party Support) 0.617** 0.620** 0.303 0.939*** 0.486 0.484 0.142 1.023**
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially -0.124 -0.124 -0.409* -0.087 -0.014 -0.014 -0.402 0.025
    m(Comfortably Financially) 0.016 0.017 0.504 -0.315 -1.416 -1.404 -0.252 -1.173
    Alright Financially -0.061 -0.061 -0.307 -0.016 -0.161 -0.161 -0.527* -0.084
    m(Alright Financially) 0.243 0.254 0.758 0.100 -1.063 -1.055 -0.011 -0.626
    Just Getting by Financially -0.018 -0.019 -0.221 0.008 -0.306 -0.306 -0.565** -0.181
    m(Getting by Financially) 0.079 0.064 0.510 0.101 -0.652 -0.642 0.384 -0.129
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year 0.046 0.046 0.060 0.036 0.079 0.079 0.060 0.073
    m(Better Finances vs last year) 0.023 0.015 0.222 -0.201 0.646 0.644 0.620 0.584
    Worse Finances vs last year 0.084 0.084 0.060 0.074 0.022 0.022 -0.035 0.055
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) -0.592 -0.581 -0.236 -0.324 -1.892*** -1.894*** -1.762** -1.763**
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances 0.008 0.009 0.079 0.025 -0.027 -0.027 0.060 0.010
    m(Expect Better Finances) 0.298 0.278 -0.006 0.085 -0.124 -0.116 0.056 0.174
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances 0.054 0.054 0.091 0.148 -0.027 -0.027 0.059 0.090
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) 0.326 0.312 -0.285 -0.058 0.838 0.835 0.427 1.106
Original Sample Member -0.182 0.037
Constant -2.885*** -2.841*** -3.171*** -2.531*** -2.173** -2.187** -2.780** -2.754**
Log-Likelihood -1235.478 -1234.929 -1122.764 -936.516 -664.815 -664.805 -594.406 -511.559
Sample Size 4,665 4,665 4,665 3,453 2,961 2,961 2,961 2,177
Wald (Global Significance) 500.286 498.601 410.237 387.753 280.815 281.819 220.901 221.947
Intra-Class Correlation 0.700*** 0.700*** 0.719*** 0.692*** 0.718*** 0.718*** 0.749*** 0.731***
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 5 (in the main article).
3. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 5 (in the main article) also apply here.
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TABLE A9.— PARTISAN DYNAMIC CRE  PROBIT MODELS OF LABOUR PARTY SUPPORT, 1999-2006
Unbalanced (I-VI) I II III IV V VI
Baseline (Male) Sample Dummy (Male) Weights (Male) Baseline (Female) Sample Dummy (Female) Weights (Female)
Lagged Labour Support 1.005*** 1.004*** 1.018*** 0.846*** 0.846*** 0.891***
Labour Supporter (1999) 5.349*** 5.349*** 5.243*** 4.989*** 4.989*** 4.885***
Strong Party Support -0.717*** -0.712*** -0.809*** -0.089 -0.089 -0.140
m(Strong Party Support) 0.602 0.642 0.675 0.508 0.508 0.191
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially -0.544 -0.551 -0.352 -0.125 -0.125 -0.012
    m(Comfortably Financially) 0.846 0.783 0.567 -1.944** -1.944** -2.223**
    Alright Financially -0.728* -0.736* -0.446 -0.102 -0.101 -0.009
    m(Alright Financially) 0.601 0.538 0.541 -1.956** -1.953** -2.083**
    Just Getting by Financially -0.443 -0.448 -0.264 0.262 0.262 0.389
    m(Getting by Financially) 0.323 0.330 0.349 -2.041** -2.043** -2.307***
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year 0.479** 0.488** 0.589*** 0.135 0.135 0.157
    m(Better Finances vs last year) -0.315 -0.262 -0.553 -0.347 -0.349 -0.062
    Worse Finances vs last year -0.103 -0.097 -0.074 0.183 0.183 0.219
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) -0.271 -0.343 -0.377 -1.784*** -1.785*** -0.888
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances -0.020 -0.024 -0.029 -0.302 -0.302 -0.306
    m(Expect Better Finances) -0.665 -0.656 -0.329 0.053 0.048 -0.194
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances 0.055 0.052 -0.048 -0.145 -0.145 0.048
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) -0.061 -0.121 -0.245 0.237 0.241 -0.604
Original Sample Member 0.705** -0.021
Constant -3.169*** -3.316*** -2.924** -0.853 -0.849 -1.097
Log-Likelihood -353.76 -351.378 -348.741 -453.18 -453.177 -400.478
Sample Size 2,384 2,384 2,384 2,687 2,687 2,687
Wald (Global Significance) 225.630 223.326 272.774 307.285 313.866 319.450
Intra-Class Correlation 0.735*** 0.732*** 0.724*** 0.705*** 0.705*** 0.702***
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 7 (in the main article).
3. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 7 (in the main article) also apply here.
9. ESTIMATIONS OF SNP SUPPORT (1999-2006) INCLUDING ANNUAL
HOUSEHOLD EQUIVALENT INCOME
TABLE A10.— MALE (Including Equivalent Income) DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged SNP Support 0.656*** 0.657*** 0.715*** 0.686*** 0.717*** 0.717*** 0.764*** 0.729***
SNP Supporter (1999) 3.417*** 3.407*** 3.391*** 3.469*** 3.477*** 3.479*** 3.324*** 3.405***
Strong Party Support 0.236* 0.236* 0.284 0.259 0.312* 0.312* 0.370* 0.321
m(Strong Party Support) 0.607** 0.607** 0.536* 0.637** 0.561* 0.560* 0.365 0.678*
Objective Income Measure
Ln(Equivalent Income) 0.015 0.014 0.028 -0.036 -0.035 -0.035 -0.039 -0.055
m(Ln Equivalent Income) -0.039 -0.030 0.050 0.129 0.098 0.097 0.165 0.241
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year -0.165 -0.165 -0.196 -0.302** -0.011 -0.011 -0.072 -0.176
    m(Better Finances vs last year) -0.320 -0.305 -0.311 -0.470 -0.587 -0.587 -0.842 -1.185
    Worse Finances vs last year 0.240* 0.241* 0.223* 0.317** 0.215 0.215 0.196 0.255
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) -0.555 -0.533 -0.634 -0.438 -0.679 -0.682 -0.535 -0.923
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances 0.181 0.181 0.200 0.195 0.243* 0.243* 0.263* 0.304**
    m(Expect Better Finances) 0.409 0.397 0.481 0.588 0.689 0.691 0.915 1.297**
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances -0.232 -0.231 -0.196 -0.395** -0.189 -0.189 -0.171 -0.260
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) 1.493*** 1.500*** 1.832*** 1.618*** 1.752** 1.751** 1.938** 2.422***
Original Sample Member -0.151 0.018
Constant -2.801** -2.846** -3.857** -4.167** -3.693** -3.687* -3.829** -5.587***
Log-Likelihood -914.182 -913.866 -937.766 -724.064 -610.468 -610.466 -636.832 -487.302
Sample Size 4,226 4,226 4,226 3,298 2,919 2,919 2,919 2,282
Wald (Global Significance) 445.054 450.323 426.938 336.788 313.894 320.040 301.313 256.935
Intra-Class Correlation 0.634*** 0.634*** 0.636*** 0.658*** 0.645*** 0.645*** 0.616*** 0.647***
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 5 (in the main article).
3. Ln(Equivalent Income) and m(Ln Equivalent Income) denote annual equivalent household income and its within-mean, respectively.
4. Equivalent income is computed as annual household income divided by the square root of the number of household members.
5. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 5 (in the main article) also apply here.
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TABLE A11.— FEMALE (Including Equivalent Income) DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged SNP Support 0.483*** 0.486*** 0.494*** 0.507*** 0.374** 0.379** 0.324* 0.270
SNP Supporter (1999) 3.562*** 3.550*** 3.484*** 3.621*** 4.027*** 3.991*** 4.211*** 4.273***
Strong Party Support 0.438*** 0.437*** 0.411*** 0.507*** 0.541*** 0.540*** 0.563*** 0.719***
m(Strong Party Support) -0.249 -0.248 -0.045 -0.368 -0.143 -0.124 0.362 -0.304
Objective Income Measure
Ln(Equivalent Income) -0.174* -0.173* -0.102 -0.199* -0.200 -0.196 -0.148 -0.186
m(Ln Equivalent Income) 0.264 0.267 0.336 0.495** 0.059 0.051 0.373 0.418
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year -0.221* -0.221* -0.224* -0.247* -0.222 -0.219 -0.106 -0.200
    m(Better Finances vs last year) 0.088 0.086 0.372 -0.188 -0.283 -0.255 0.174 -0.546
    Worse Finances vs last year -0.108 -0.108 -0.081 -0.146 -0.096 -0.095 -0.020 -0.116
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) 0.356 0.355 0.555 0.345 0.004 0.043 0.455 -0.017
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances 0.223* 0.223* 0.143 0.173 0.130 0.131 0.016 -0.011
    m(Expect Better Finances) 0.126 0.110 -0.084 0.546 0.490 0.400 -0.258 0.712
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances 0.146 0.145 0.161 0.150 0.138 0.134 0.094 0.173
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) -0.368 -0.369 -0.544 -0.419 0.178 0.299 -0.704 -0.342
Original Sample Member -0.153 -0.463*
Constant -3.672** -3.648** -5.236*** -5.735*** -1.136 -0.964 -5.066 -4.230
Log-Likelihood -911.034 -910.644 -831.925 -692.409 -530.959 -529.580 -459.907 -415.699
Sample Size 4,577 4,577 4,577 3,372 2,884 2,884 2,884 2,107
Wald (Global Significance) 435.206 438.104 377.474 334.302 256.320 263.569 233.054 189.425
Intra-Class Correlation 0.622*** 0.620*** 0.604*** 0.638*** 0.673*** 0.666*** 0.695*** 0.714***
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 5 (in the main article).
3. Ln(Equivalent Income) and m(Ln Equivalent Income) denote annual equivalent household income and its within-mean, respectively.
4. Equivalent income is computed as annual household income divided by the square root of the number of household members.
5. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 5 (in the main article) also apply here.
TABLE A12.— PARTISAN (Including Equivalent Income) DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
Unbalanced (I-VI) I II III IV V VI
Baseline (Male) Sample Dummy (Male) Weights (Male) Baseline (Female) Sample Dummy (Female) Weights (Female)
Lagged SNP Support 0.791*** 0.793*** 0.934*** 0.660** 0.660** 0.630**
SNP Supporter (1999) 5.988*** 5.961*** 6.392*** 6.133*** 6.131*** 6.254***
Strong Party Support 0.504* 0.503* 0.552* 0.174 0.174 0.235
m(Strong Party Support) 0.486 0.478 0.572 -0.282 -0.283 -0.182
Objective Income Measure
Ln(Equivalent Income) -0.173 -0.175 -0.211 -0.321*** -0.320** -0.383***
m(Ln Equivalent Income) 0.037 0.057 0.179 0.221 0.220 0.592
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year -0.070 -0.071 -0.163 -0.399* -0.399* -0.541**
    m(Better Finances vs last year) -1.407* -1.401* -1.513 1.125* 1.124* 1.311*
    Worse Finances vs last year 0.356 0.355 0.423* -0.212 -0.212 -0.108
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) -0.850 -0.836 -1.134 0.719 0.717 0.316
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances 0.045 0.046 0.033 0.371 0.371 0.433*
    m(Expect Better Finances) 1.553** 1.545** 1.483* 0.440 0.435 0.364
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances 0.032 0.032 0.074 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) 0.439 0.443 1.288 -0.909 -0.905 -0.442
Original Sample Member -0.142 -0.018
Constant -3.469 -3.573 -5.445 -3.433 -3.429 -6.779**
Log-Likelihood -275.078 -275.014 -256.961 -307.690 -307.689 -260.297
Sample Size 2,363 2,363 2,363 2,627 2,627 2,627
Wald (Global Significance) 163.604 172.345 159.259 147.506 150.34 157.395
Intra-Class Correlation 0.758*** 0.757*** 0.782*** 0.791*** 0.791*** 0.773***
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 7 (in the main article).
3. Ln(Equivalent Income) and m(Ln Equivalent Income) denote annual equivalent household income and its within-mean, respectively.
4. Equivalent income is computed as annual household income divided by the square root of the number of household members.
5. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 7 (in the main article) also apply here.
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10. ESTIMATIONS OF SNP SUPPORT (1999-2006) INCLUDING
PERCEIVED NATIONALITY IN 1999
TABLE A13.— MALE (Including Perceived Nationality in 1999) DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged SNP Support 0.656*** 0.656*** 0.710*** 0.691*** 0.726*** 0.725*** 0.759*** 0.750***
SNP Supporter (1999) 3.242*** 3.241*** 3.234*** 3.181*** 3.305*** 3.311*** 3.224*** 3.067***
Strong Party Support 0.265* 0.265* 0.306* 0.305* 0.369** 0.369** 0.418* 0.405**
m(Strong Party Support) 0.584** 0.583** 0.540* 0.661** 0.599* 0.595* 0.394 0.710*
Feel Scottish/More Scottish 0.541*** 0.536*** 0.494** 0.877*** 0.444* 0.448* 0.307 0.962***
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially 0.035 0.035 -0.008 0.049 0.312 0.312 0.227 0.191
    m(Comfortably Financially) 0.076 0.074 0.067 1.039 -1.207 -1.206 -1.039 0.434
    Alright Financially 0.016 0.016 -0.123 0.051 0.263 0.263 0.071 0.220
    m(Alright Financially) 0.161 0.161 -0.008 1.004 -0.999 -1.001 -0.936 0.386
    Just Getting by Financially -0.082 -0.082 -0.219 -0.047 -0.125 -0.125 -0.263 -0.145
    m(Getting by Financially) 0.449 0.445 0.550 1.308** -0.329 -0.327 -0.026 0.959
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year -0.172 -0.172 -0.196 -0.309** -0.042 -0.042 -0.091 -0.194
    m(Better Finances vs last year) -0.181 -0.177 -0.139 -0.343 -0.122 -0.126 -0.300 -0.824
    Worse Finances vs last year 0.246* 0.247* 0.229 0.319* 0.274 0.274 0.254 0.287
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) -0.429 -0.424 -0.500 -0.159 -0.881 -0.892 -0.772 -0.791
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances 0.187 0.187 0.207 0.210 0.263** 0.263** 0.282* 0.325**
    m(Expect Better Finances) 0.387 0.384 0.455 0.608 0.452 0.458 0.673 1.277**
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances -0.233 -0.233 -0.202 -0.392** -0.180 -0.180 -0.172 -0.239
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) 1.505*** 1.507*** 1.779*** 1.846*** 1.531* 1.529* 1.788** 2.381***
Original Sample Member -0.038 0.069
Constant -3.613*** -3.600*** -3.672*** -4.996*** -2.954*** -2.968*** -2.571*** -5.236***
Log-Likelihood -911.042 -911.022 -932.802 -717.641 -608.558 -608.522 -633.523 -484.176
Sample Size 4,250 4,250 4,250 3,327 2,947 2,947 2,947 2,317
Wald (Global Significance) 451.238 462.914 422.639 357.561 329.245 343.975 313.174 268.41
Intra-Class Correlation 0.624*** 0.624*** 0.630*** 0.639*** 0.640*** 0.640*** 0.616*** 0.626***
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 5 (in the main article).
3. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 5 (in the main article) also apply here.
TABLE A14.— FEMALE (Including Perceived Nationality in 1999) DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
Unbalanced (I-IV)/Balanced (V-VIII) I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension Baseline Sample Dummy Weights Extension
Lagged SNP Support 0.523*** 0.525*** 0.523*** 0.521*** 0.400** 0.405** 0.355** 0.292
SNP Supporter (1999) 3.402*** 3.390*** 3.346*** 3.485*** 3.764*** 3.720*** 3.906*** 3.919***
Strong Party Support 0.423*** 0.423*** 0.393*** 0.480*** 0.538*** 0.537*** 0.550*** 0.699***
m(Strong Party Support) -0.213 -0.212 0.002 -0.267 0.029 0.052 0.514 -0.040
Feel Scottish/More Scottish 0.484*** 0.482*** 0.518*** 0.418** 0.497** 0.506** 0.449 0.482
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially -0.074 -0.074 0.029 -0.089 -0.102 -0.102 0.007 0.110
    m(Comfortably Financially) 0.767 0.771 0.567 1.436** 0.584 0.452 -0.313 1.267
    Alright Financially 0.073 0.073 0.167 0.043 0.160 0.158 0.299 0.307
    m(Alright Financially) 0.525 0.534 0.403 1.043* 0.627 0.573 -0.221 1.229
    Just Getting by Financially 0.058 0.057 0.075 0.072 0.284 0.280 0.274 0.459
    m(Getting by Financially) 0.304 0.308 0.163 0.657 -0.545 -0.630 -1.377* -0.148
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year -0.230* -0.230* -0.249* -0.218 -0.157 -0.156 -0.072 -0.142
    m(Better Finances vs last year) -0.147 -0.150 0.191 -0.441 -0.671 -0.635 -0.127 -1.134*
    Worse Finances vs last year -0.127 -0.128 -0.083 -0.149 -0.102 -0.102 -0.013 -0.119
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) 0.624 0.629 0.850* 0.795 0.519 0.543 0.734 0.655
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances 0.225* 0.226* 0.145 0.154 0.117 0.119 0.014 -0.028
    m(Expect Better Finances) 0.201 0.192 -0.038 0.657* 0.721 0.635 -0.027 1.142
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances 0.139 0.138 0.165 0.130 0.124 0.121 0.108 0.163
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) -0.370 -0.369 -0.614 -0.311 0.215 0.319 -0.618 -0.314
Original Sample Member -0.122 -0.438*
Constant -3.537*** -3.493*** -3.885*** -4.203*** -3.504*** -3.330*** -3.397*** -4.056***
Log-Likelihood -924.54 -924.28 -840.677 -707.992 -545.82 -544.487 -473.604 -431.269
Sample Size 4,662 4,662 4,662 3,450 2,961 2,961 2,961 2,177
Wald (Global Significance) 471.708 474.128 431.498 357.969 293.313 299.803 255.725 206.897
Intra-Class Correlation 0.610*** 0.609*** 0.600*** 0.622*** 0.654*** 0.648*** 0.683*** 0.694***
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 5 (in the main article).
3. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 5 (in the main article) also apply here.
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TABLE A15.— PARTISAN (Including Perceived Nationality in 1999) DYNAMIC CRE PROBIT MODELS OF SNP SUPPORT, 1999-2006
Unbalanced (I-VI) I II III IV V VI
Baseline (Male) Sample Dummy (Male) Weights (Male) Baseline (Female) Sample Dummy (Female) Weights (Female)
Lagged SNP Support 0.767*** 0.770*** 0.941*** 0.706** 0.707** 0.703**
SNP Supporter (1999) 6.188*** 6.158*** 6.595*** 5.869*** 5.856*** 5.859***
Strong Party Support 0.488* 0.487* 0.556* 0.187 0.187 0.222
m(Strong Party Support) 0.526 0.514 0.557 -0.137 -0.140 -0.021
Feel Scottish/More Scottish 0.188 0.177 -0.069 0.692* 0.700* 0.784**
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially -0.207 -0.207 -0.394 -0.091 -0.091 -0.020
    m(Comfortably Financially) 0.851 0.835 1.303 1.503 1.506 1.620*
    Alright Financially 0.440 0.440 0.262 0.047 0.048 0.140
    m(Alright Financially) 1.049 1.041 1.252 2.024** 2.047** 2.115**
    Just Getting by Financially 0.128 0.129 0.014 -0.151 -0.149 -0.229
    m(Getting by Financially) 1.602 1.577 2.194 0.998 0.994 0.636
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year -0.027 -0.028 -0.137 -0.389* -0.388* -0.551**
    m(Better Finances vs last year) -1.257 -1.249 -1.254 0.781 0.778 0.901
    Worse Finances vs last year 0.390 0.390 0.431 -0.197 -0.197 -0.103
    m(Worse Finances vs last year) -0.737 -0.722 -0.929 1.197 1.194 0.985
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances 0.082 0.082 0.052 0.332 0.333 0.395*
    m(Expect Better Finances) 1.416* 1.409* 1.288* 0.543 0.506 0.439
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances -0.015 -0.016 0.023 0.092 0.091 0.075
    m(Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances) 0.659 0.659 1.349 -0.929 -0.893 -0.327
Original Sample Member -0.143 -0.154
Constant -6.210*** -6.128*** -7.273*** -6.175*** -6.158*** -6.869***
Log-Likelihood -270.405 -270.342 -252.863 -308.128 -308.048 -257.307
Sample Size 2,384 2,384 2,384 2,685 2,685 2,685
Wald (Global Significance) 175.175 183.729 189.317 177.519 183.334 197.202
Intra-Class Correlation 0.764*** 0.762*** 0.779*** 0.773*** 0.772*** 0.744***
1. Only coefficients on selected key variables displayed. 2. Estimations include all remaining explanatory variables appearing in Table 7 (in the main article).
3. Notes 1-7 appearing at the bottom of Table 7 (in the main article) also apply here.
11. TRANSITION PROBABILITIES MATRICES: PARTISANS 1999-2006
TABLE A16.— PARTISAN MALE VOTERS:  POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT TRANSITION PROBABILITIES MATRIX, (1999-2006)
PARTY SUPPORTED PARTY SUPPORTED: frequency (transition count), Prob(yi ,t+1 = vs|yi ,t = vr)
frequency (transition count)
Conservative Labour Lib dem /Lib/SDP SNP other TOTAL
Conservative 375 8 3 7 3 396
94.7 2.02 0.76 1.77 0.76 100
Labour 4 1,046 17 21 16 1,104
0.36 94.75 1.54 1.9 1.45 100
Lib dem /Lib/SDP 3 9 155 3 1 171
1.75 5.26 90.64 1.75 0.58 100
SNP 6 31 6 598 11 652
0.92 4.75 0.92 91.72 1.69 100
other 3 6 3 6 43 61
4.92 9.84 4.92 9.84 70.49 100
TOTAL (t>1999): 391 1,100 184 635 74 2,384
Party support 2000-2006 16.4 46.14 7.72 26.64 3.1 100
1. Source: University of Essex, ISER, BHPS, Waves 9-16. 2. Other: Plaid Cymru/Green/Other Party/other answer/don't know/none.
3. Off-diagonal row (r)/column (s) elements denote total voter outflow/inflow during (1999-2006), respectively.
4. r=1,… ,R and s=1,… .,S denote party preference (or other response), (v); r=s along the main diagonal, only.
5.  Sample includes individuals with Ti>2 and no missing values in any of the covariates used in the estimations provided in Table 7.
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TABLE A17.— PARTISAN FEMALE VOTERS:  POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT TRANSITION PROBABILITIES MATRIX, (1999-2006)
PARTY SUPPORTED PARTY SUPPORTED: frequency (transition count), Prob(yi ,t+1 = vs|yi ,t = vr)
frequency (transition count)
Conservative Labour Lib dem /Lib/SDP SNP other TOTAL
Conservative 548 8 22 2 0 580
94.48 1.38 3.79 0.34 0 100
Labour 4 1,183 21 34 15 1,257
0.32 94.11 1.67 2.7 1.19 100
Lib dem /Lib/SDP 16 18 254 4 3 295
5.42 6.1 86.1 1.36 1.02 100
SNP 2 37 5 427 14 485
0.41 7.63 1.03 88.04 2.89 100
other 0 16 4 8 42 70
0 22.86 5.71 11.43 60 100
TOTAL (t>1999): 570 1,262 306 475 74 2,687
Party support 2000-2006 21.21 46.97 11.39 17.68 2.75 100
1. Source: University of Essex, ISER, BHPS, Waves 9-16. 2. Other: Green/Other Party/other answer/don't know/none.
3. Off-diagonal row (r)/column (s) elements denote total voter outflow/inflow during (1999-2006), respectively.
4. r=1,… ,R and s=1,… .,S denote party preference (or other response), (v); r=s along the main diagonal, only.
5.  Sample includes individuals with Ti>2 and no missing values in any of the covariates used in the estimations provided in Table 7.
12. TRANSITION PROBABILITIES MATRICES: 1999-2002
TABLE A18.— MALE VOTERS:  POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT TRANSITION PROBABILITIES MATRIX, (1999-2002)
PARTY SUPPORTED PARTY SUPPORTED: frequency (transition count), Prob(yi ,t+1 = vs|yi ,t = vr)
frequency (transition count)
Conservative Labour Lib dem /Lib/SDP SNP other none TOTAL
Conservative 248 19 5 9 6 16 303
81.85 6.27 1.65 2.97 1.98 5.28 100
Labour 13 879 25 52 14 20 1,003
1.3 87.64 2.49 5.18 1.4 1.99 100
Lib dem /Lib/SDP 2 19 156 9 1 1 188
1.06 10.11 82.98 4.79 0.53 0.53 100
SNP 10 70 13 481 11 23 608
1.64 11.51 2.14 79.11 1.81 3.78 100
other 6 9 2 3 27 6 53
11.32 16.98 3.77 5.66 50.94 11.32 100
none 10 20 7 11 4 82 134
7.46 14.93 5.22 8.21 2.99 61.19 100
TOTAL (t>1999): 289 1,016 208 565 63 148 2,289
Party support 2000-2002 12.63 44.39 9.09 24.68 2.75 6.47 100
1. Source: University of Essex, ISER, BHPS, Waves 9-16. 2. Other: Plaid Cymru/Green/Other Party/other answer.
3. Off-diagonal row (r)/column (s) elements denote total voter outflow/inflow during (1999-2002), respectively.
4. r=1,… ,R and s=1,… .,S denote party preference (or other response), (v); r=s along the main diagonal, only.
5. Sample includes individuals with Ti>2 and no missing values in any of the covariates in the (full sample compact unbalanced) estimations provided in Table 12.
38
TABLE A19.— FEMALE VOTERS:  POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT TRANSITION PROBABILITIES MATRIX, (1999-2002)
PARTY SUPPORTED PARTY SUPPORTED: frequency (transition count), Prob(yi ,t+1 = vs|yi ,t = vr)
frequency (transition count)
Conservative Labour Lib dem /Lib/SDP SNP other none TOTAL
Conservative 365 20 21 7 3 13 429
85.08 4.66 4.9 1.63 0.7 3.03 100
Labour 10 1,020 24 56 6 28 1,144
0.87 89.16 2.1 4.9 0.52 2.45 100
Lib dem /Lib/SDP 16 15 226 9 2 8 276
5.8 5.43 81.88 3.26 0.72 2.9 100
SNP 4 62 9 416 7 28 526
0.76 11.79 1.71 79.09 1.33 5.32 100
other 3 10 7 3 29 5 57
5.26 17.54 12.28 5.26 50.88 8.77 100
none 9 33 6 18 3 82 151
5.96 21.85 3.97 11.92 1.99 54.3 100
TOTAL (t>1999): 407 1,160 293 509 50 164 2,583
Party support 2000-2002 15.76 44.91 11.34 19.71 1.94 6.35 100
1. Source: University of Essex, ISER, BHPS, Waves 9-16. 2. Other: Green/Other Party/other answer.
3. Off-diagonal row (r)/column (s) elements denote total voter outflow/inflow during (1999-2002), respectively.
4. r=1,… ,R and s=1,… .,S denote party preference (or other response), (v); r=s along the main diagonal, only.
5. Sample includes individuals with Ti>2 and no missing values in any of the covariates in the (full sample compact unbalanced) estimations provided in Table 13.
13. TRANSITION PROBABILITIES MATRICES: 2003-2006
TABLE A20.— MALE VOTERS:  POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT TRANSITION PROBABILITIES MATRIX, (2003-2006)
PARTY SUPPORTED PARTY SUPPORTED: frequency (transition count), Prob(yi ,t+1 = vs|yi ,t = vr)
frequency (transition count)
Conservative Labour Lib dem /Lib/SDP SNP other none TOTAL
Conservative 206 3 9 7 0 8 233
88.41 1.29 3.86 3 0 3.43 100
Labour 7 527 18 34 7 22 615
1.14 85.69 2.93 5.53 1.14 3.58 100
Lib dem /Lib/SDP 9 18 179 10 6 12 234
3.85 7.69 76.5 4.27 2.56 5.13 100
SNP 5 31 11 295 4 9 355
1.41 8.73 3.1 83.1 1.13 2.54 100
other 3 3 6 7 32 7 58
5.17 5.17 10.34 12.07 55.17 12.07 100
none 5 24 5 14 3 130 181
2.76 13.26 2.76 7.73 1.66 71.82 100
TOTAL (t>2003): 235 606 228 367 52 188 1,676
Party support 2004-2006 14.02 36.16 13.6 21.9 3.1 11.22 100
1. Source: University of Essex, ISER, BHPS, Waves 9-16. 2. Other: Green/Other Party/other answer.
3. Off-diagonal row (r)/column (s) elements denote total voter outflow/inflow during (2003-2006), respectively.
4. r=1,… ,R and s=1,… .,S denote party preference (or other response), (v); r=s along the main diagonal, only.
5. Sample includes individuals with Ti>2 and no missing values in any of the covariates in the (full sample compact unbalanced) estimations provided in Table 14.
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TABLE A21.— FEMALE VOTERS:  POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT TRANSITION PROBABILITIES MATRIX, (2003-2006)
PARTY SUPPORTED PARTY SUPPORTED: frequency (transition count), Prob(yi ,t+1 = vs|yi ,t = vr)
frequency (transition count)
Conservative Labour Lib dem /Lib/SDP SNP other none TOTAL
Conservative 237 3 19 5 0 8 272
87.13 1.1 6.99 1.84 0 2.94 100
Labour 2 601 18 34 6 22 683
0.29 87.99 2.64 4.98 0.88 3.22 100
Lib dem /Lib/SDP 16 18 234 14 4 7 293
5.46 6.14 79.86 4.78 1.37 2.39 100
SNP 2 35 12 260 4 22 335
0.6 10.45 3.58 77.61 1.19 6.57 100
other 1 8 3 6 37 3 58
1.72 13.79 5.17 10.34 63.79 5.17 100
none 9 22 7 19 3 168 228
3.95 9.65 3.07 8.33 1.32 73.68 100
TOTAL (t>2003): 267 687 293 338 54 230 1,869
Party support 2004-2006 14.29 36.76 15.68 18.08 2.89 12.31 100
1. Source: University of Essex, ISER, BHPS, Waves 9-16. 2. Other: Green/Other Party/other answer.
3. Off-diagonal row (r)/column (s) elements denote total voter outflow/inflow during (2003-2006), respectively.
4. r=1,… ,R and s=1,… .,S denote party preference (or other response), (v); r=s along the main diagonal, only.
5. Sample includes individuals with Ti>2 and no missing values in any of the covariates in the (full sample compact unbalanced) estimations provided in Table 15.
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14. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS TABLES
TABLE A22— MALE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT, 1999-2006
UNBALANCED BALANCED
VARIABLES FULL SAMPLE             EXTENSION FULL SAMPLE             EXTENSION
MEAN SD MEAN SD MEAN SD MEAN SD
Lagged SNP Support 0.249 (0.106) 0.258 (0.118) 0.247 (0.132) 0.256 (0.145)
SNP Supporter (1999) 0.281 (0.105) 0.292 (0.119) 0.280 (0.124) 0.295 (0.138)
Strong Party Support 0.386 (0.069) 0.391 (0.079) 0.406 (0.088) 0.404 (0.100)
     Age 25-34 0.131 (0.176) 0.128 (0.190) 0.128 (0.264) 0.127 (0.273)
     Age 35-44 0.223 (0.192) 0.208 (0.211) 0.223 (0.291) 0.203 (0.305)
     Age >44 0.593 (0.182) 0.607 (0.193) 0.613 (0.281) 0.627 (0.287)
Original Sample Member 0.217 (0.086) 0.213 (0.106)
Married/Civil Partnership 0.625 (0.084) 0.607 (0.093) 0.632 (0.101) 0.614 (0.113)
Employed/Self-employed 0.612 (0.089) 0.599 (0.098) 0.635 (0.106) 0.624 (0.115)
University Qualifications 0.170 (0.104) 0.174 (0.114) 0.172 (0.130) 0.184 (0.133)
Excellent,Good/Very Good Health 0.686 (0.082) 0.688 (0.093) 0.693 (0.104) 0.701 (0.118)
Number of Children 0.480 (0.044) 0.424 (0.048) 0.482 (0.051) 0.418 (0.058)
Own House/Mortgage 0.746 (0.082) 0.742 (0.094) 0.780 (0.110) 0.783 (0.124)
Region: Scottish Local Authority
    Glasgow 0.088 (0.162) 0.107 (0.172) 0.071 (0.211) 0.088 (0.224)
    Lothians 0.245 (0.117) 0.242 (0.134) 0.243 (0.146) 0.239 (0.168)
    Highlands, Islands 0.041 (0.158) 0.052 (0.163) 0.043 (0.221) 0.055 (0.231)
    Central 0.079 (0.158) 0.075 (0.174) 0.080 (0.184) 0.077 (0.199)
    West 0.145 (0.127) 0.137 (0.143) 0.150 (0.163) 0.144 (0.187)
    South 0.091 (0.135) 0.066 (0.168) 0.088 (0.164) 0.064 (0.183)
    Mid-Scotland, Fife 0.117 (0.123) 0.124 (0.133) 0.118 (0.146) 0.127 (0.157)
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially 0.327 (0.177) 0.336 (0.193) 0.330 (0.234) 0.345 (0.252)
    Alright Financially 0.366 (0.160) 0.360 (0.173) 0.370 (0.212) 0.367 (0.225)
    Just Getting by Financially 0.239 (0.153) 0.237 (0.170) 0.238 (0.209) 0.229 (0.233)
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year 0.267 (0.084) 0.271 (0.091) 0.260 (0.101) 0.269 (0.105)
    Worse Finances vs last year 0.181 (0.086) 0.171 (0.098) 0.182 (0.102) 0.172 (0.118)
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances 0.263 (0.079) 0.265 (0.086) 0.256 (0.092) 0.259 (0.098)
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances 0.106 (0.100) 0.100 (0.106) 0.101 (0.120) 0.098 (0.126)
Mean SNP Support 0.239 0.247 0.243 0.250
Number of Observations 4,257 3,334 2,954 2,324
1. Source: University of Essex, ISER, BHPS, Waves 9-16.
2. Unbalanced panels are compact; Extension: Scotland extension sample; Full sample: Original BHPS sample + Scotland extension sample.
3. Reference Groups: Age [16-25); Marital Status: Separated/Divorced/Widowed/ Never Married;
Current Economic Activity: Unemployed/Retired/Family Care/Full Time Student/Long Term Sick, Disabled/Gvt Training Scheme/Other;
Highest Academic Qualification: HND, HNC, Teaching/A Level/O Level/CSE/none of these;
Self-Assessed Health: Very Poor, Poor/Fair Health; Housing Tenure: Local Authority/Housing Association Rent/Rented House;
Region: North East Scotland; Current Financial Status: Finding it Quite/Very Difficult;
Change in Financial Position Versus Last Year:  About the Same; Financial Expectations: About the Same.
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TABLE A23.— FEMALE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT, 1999-2006
UNBALANCED BALANCED
VARIABLES FULL SAMPLE             EXTENSION FULL SAMPLE             EXTENSION
MEAN SD MEAN SD MEAN SD MEAN SD
Lagged SNP Support 0.198 (0.109) 0.203 (0.122) 0.197 (0.137) 0.209 (0.152)
SNP Supporter (1999) 0.221 (0.106) 0.228 (0.117) 0.225 (0.132) 0.235 (0.144)
Strong Party Support 0.339 (0.068) 0.345 (0.077) 0.343 (0.092) 0.352 (0.103)
     Age 25-34 0.147 (0.176) 0.139 (0.198) 0.130 (0.326) 0.113 (0.373)
     Age 35-44 0.209 (0.178) 0.201 (0.197) 0.209 (0.318) 0.196 (0.363)
     Age >44 0.602 (0.167) 0.616 (0.190) 0.635 (0.305) 0.664 (0.355)
Original Sample Member 0.260 (0.087) 0.265 (0.109)
Married/Civil Partnership 0.530 (0.076) 0.518 (0.088) 0.537 (0.102) 0.525 (0.115)
Employed/Self-employed 0.488 (0.077) 0.470 (0.093) 0.491 (0.104) 0.470 (0.125)
University Qualifications 0.156 (0.105) 0.140 (0.121) 0.157 (0.144) 0.132 (0.154)
Excellent,Good/Very Good Health 0.657 (0.071) 0.663 (0.082) 0.674 (0.095) 0.680 (0.105)
Number of Children 0.531 (0.047) 0.491 (0.055) 0.511 (0.063) 0.454 (0.071)
Own House/Mortgage 0.706 (0.087) 0.683 (0.100) 0.713 (0.114) 0.675 (0.129)
Region: Scottish Local Authority
    Glasgow 0.084 (0.133) 0.104 (0.142) 0.074 (0.183) 0.092 (0.194)
    Lothians 0.252 (0.115) 0.252 (0.128) 0.256 (0.153) 0.257 (0.175)
    Highlands, Islands 0.044 (0.209) 0.057 (0.226) 0.044 (0.233) 0.058 (0.263)
    Central 0.074 (0.156) 0.071 (0.182) 0.078 (0.188) 0.071 (0.233)
    West 0.153 (0.130) 0.139 (0.150) 0.150 (0.186) 0.132 (0.214)
    South 0.106 (0.130) 0.085 (0.168) 0.114 (0.172) 0.101 (0.210)
    Mid-Scotland, Fife 0.108 (0.168) 0.115 (0.188) 0.114 (0.232) 0.122 (0.266)
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially 0.341 (0.155) 0.347 (0.177) 0.355 (0.192) 0.371 (0.212)
    Alright Financially 0.384 (0.145) 0.373 (0.166) 0.386 (0.177) 0.373 (0.202)
    Just Getting by Financially 0.211 (0.134) 0.215 (0.161) 0.205 (0.158) 0.206 (0.191)
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year 0.254 (0.082) 0.259 (0.092) 0.246 (0.106) 0.250 (0.115)
    Worse Finances vs last year 0.158 (0.095) 0.151 (0.110) 0.157 (0.129) 0.143 (0.151)
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances 0.227 (0.086) 0.234 (0.098) 0.219 (0.113) 0.226 (0.129)
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances 0.097 (0.114) 0.095 (0.132) 0.093 (0.136) 0.086 (0.155)
Mean SNP Support 0.192 0.198 0.193 0.207
Number of Observations 4,665 3,453 2,961 2,177
1. Source: University of Essex, ISER, BHPS, Waves 9-16.
2. Unbalanced panels are compact; Extension: Scotland extension sample; Full sample: Original BHPS sample + Scotland extension sample.
3. Reference Groups: Age [16-25); Marital Status: Separated/Divorced/Widowed/ Never Married;
Current Economic Activity: Unemployed/Retired/Family Care/Full Time Student/Long Term Sick, Disabled/Gvt Training Scheme/Other;
Highest Academic Qualification: HND, HNC, Teaching/A Level/O Level/CSE/none of these;
Self-Assessed Health: Very Poor, Poor/Fair Health; Housing Tenure: Local Authority/Housing Association Rent/Rented House;
Region: North East Scotland; Current Financial Status: Finding it Quite/Very Difficult;
Change in Financial Position Versus Last Year:  About the Same; Financial Expectations: About the Same.
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TABLE A24.— PARTISAN DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT
 (RESPONDENTS SUPPORT/FEEL CLOSE TO A POLITICAL PARTY), 1999-2006
UNBALANCED UNBALANCED
VARIABLES MALE FEMALE
MEAN SD MEAN SD
Lagged SNP Support 0.273 (0.203) 0.180 (0.211)
SNP Supporter (1999) 0.279 (0.217) 0.193 (0.199)
Strong Party Support 0.572 (0.115) 0.493 (0.091)
     Age 25-34 0.091 (0.250) 0.118 (0.306)
     Age 35-44 0.219 (0.303) 0.185 (0.303)
     Age >44 0.650 (0.297) 0.670 (0.286)
Original Sample Member 0.237 (0.143) 0.292 (0.126)
Married/Civil Partnership 0.662 (0.137) 0.557 (0.128)
Employed/Self-employed 0.565 (0.144) 0.445 (0.122)
University Qualifications 0.199 (0.151) 0.202 (0.140)
Excellent,Good/Very Good Health 0.674 (0.125) 0.662 (0.109)
Number of Children 0.439 (0.079) 0.461 (0.084)
Own House/Mortgage 0.749 (0.117) 0.756 (0.144)
Region: Scottish Local Authority
    Glasgow 0.096 (0.242) 0.076 (0.223)
    Lothians 0.269 (0.205) 0.276 (0.162)
    Highlands, Islands 0.044 (0.268) 0.057 (0.319)
    Central 0.076 (0.243) 0.063 (0.242)
    West 0.146 (0.199) 0.156 (0.218)
    South 0.094 (0.253) 0.103 (0.182)
    Mid-Scotland, Fife 0.099 (0.189) 0.095 (0.285)
Current Financial Situation
    Comfortably Financially 0.340 (0.198) 0.372 (0.314)
    Alright Financially 0.368 (0.198) 0.384 (0.309)
    Just Getting by Financially 0.237 (0.176) 0.193 (0.283)
Change in Financial Position
    Better Finances vs last year 0.255 (0.128) 0.248 (0.125)
    Worse Finances vs last year 0.179 (0.125) 0.152 (0.141)
Financial Expectations
    Expect Better Finances 0.239 (0.126) 0.210 (0.138)
    Uncertain/Expect Worse Finances 0.109 (0.176) 0.100 (0.181)
Mean SNP Support 0.266 0.177
Number of Observations 2,384 2,687
1. Source: University of Essex, ISER, BHPS, Waves 9-16.
2. Unbalanced panels are compact and include both Original BHPS sample + Scotland extension sample.
3. Reference Groups: Age [16-25); Marital Status: Separated/Divorced/Widowed/ Never Married;
Current Economic Activity: Unemployed/Retired/Family Care/Full Time Student/Long Term Sick, Disabled/Gvt Training Scheme/Other;
Highest Academic Qualification: HND, HNC, Teaching/A Level/O Level/CSE/none of these;
Self-Assessed Health: Very Poor, Poor/Fair Health; Housing Tenure: Local Authority/Housing Association Rent/Rented House;
Region: North East Scotland; Current Financial Status: Finding it Quite/Very Difficult;
Change in Financial Position Versus Last Year:  About the Same; Financial Expectations: About the Same.
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